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Abstract 
The development of Digital City technologies to manage and visualise spatial information has 
increasingly become a focus of the research community, and application by city authorities. 
Traditionally, the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Building Information Models 
(BIM) underlying Digital Cities have been used independently. However, integrating GIS and 
BIM into a single platform provides benefits for project and asset management, and is 
applicable to a range of issues. One of these benefits is the means to access and analyse large 
datasets describing the built environment, in order to characterise urban risk from and 
resilience to natural hazards. 
The aim of this thesis is to further explore methodologies of integration in two distinct areas. 
The first, integration through connectivity of heterogeneous datasets where GIS spatial 
infrastructure data is merged with 3D BIM building data to create a digital twin. Secondly, 
integration through analysis whereby data from the digital twin are extracted and integrated 
with computational models. To achieve this, a workflow was developed to identify the 
required datasets of a digital twin, and develop a process of integrating those datasets 
through a combination of; semi-autonomous conversion, translation and extension of data; 
and semantic web and services-based processes. Through use of a designed schema, the data 
were streamed in a homogenous format in a web-based platform.  
To demonstrate the value of this workflow with respect to urban risk and resilience, the 
process was applied to the Taiora: Queen Elizabeth II recreation and sports centre in eastern 
Christchurch, New Zealand. After integration of as-built GIS and BIM datasets, targeted data 
extraction was implemented, with outputs tailored for analysis in an infrastructure 
serviceability loss model, which assessed potable water network performance in the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. Using the same earthquake conditions as the 
serviceability loss model, performance of infrastructure assets in service at the time of the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake was compared to new assets rebuilt at the site, 
post-earthquake. Due to improved potable water infrastructure resilience resulting from 
installation of ductile piles, a decrease of 35.5% in the probability of service loss was 
estimated in the serviceability loss model. To complete the workflow, the results from the 
external analysis were uploaded to the web-based platform.  
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One of the more significant outcomes from the workflow was the identification of a lack of 
mandated metadata standards for fittings/valves connecting a building to private laterals. 
Whilst visually the GIS and BIM data show the building and pipes as connected, the semantic 
data does not include this connectivity relationship. This has no material impact on the 
current serviceability loss model as it is not one of the defined parameters. However, 
a proposed modification to the model would utilise the metadata to further assess the 
physical connection robustness, and increase the number of variables for estimating 
probability of service loss. 
This thesis has made a methodological contribution to urban resilience analysis by 
demonstrating how readily available up-to-date building and infrastructure data can be 
integrated, and with tailored extraction from a Digital City platform, be used for disaster 
impact analysis in an external computational engine, with results in turn imported and 
visualised in the Digital City platform. The workflow demonstrated that translation and 
integration of data would be more successful if a regional/national mandate was 
implemented for the submission of consent documentation in a specified standard BIM 
format. The results of this thesis have identified that the key to ensuring the success of an 
integrated tool lies in the initial workflow required to safeguard that all data can be either 
captured or translated in an interoperable format. 
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1.1. Background and Research Significance 
The occurrence of natural hazards and their impact on urban populations has existed since 
ancient times, from the Minoan eruption in Santorini in 1645 BC (Barclay, 2010), to the 
moment magnitude (Mw) 6.9 earthquake in Indonesia in August 2018 (United States 
Geological Survey [USGS], 2018). With ongoing expansion of cities and urban areas, along with 
increasing complexity of the built environment, the means with which to identify, monitor, 
and recover from these natural hazards also needs to expand.  
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], 2015) recognises that the increasing demand on 
infrastructure, through urbanisation and population growth, brings with it an increase in 
exposure and vulnerability during a disaster. While there have been some achievements in 
building resilience and reducing loss and damage, perseverance and persistence is required 
to succeed in the substantial reduction of disaster risk. Also noted is the requirement for 
strong commitment and involvement of political leadership at all levels, and that 
responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders, including the private sector. In order 
to achieve its goals, seven global targets were established and this thesis focusses on the 
following three: 
 Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower 
the average global Figure per 100,000 in the decade 2020-2090 compared to the 
period 2005-2015. 
 Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) 
by 2030. 
 Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic 
services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing 
their resilience by 2030. 
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Bruneau et al. (2003) described disaster resilience as a function of the 4 Rs: Robustness and 
Redundancy of infrastructure in its ability to limit damage, and Rapidity and Resourcefulness 
in returning the affected area to its pre-disaster condition. 
The New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment report: Stage 1 
(New Zealand Lifelines  Council [NZLC], 2017) defined resilience as “the state of being able to 
avoid utility supply outages, or maintain or quickly restore service delivery, when 
events occur”. Also presented in NZLC (2017) was the recognition of cohesiveness of a system 
whereby interdependencies between other lifelines and critical infrastructure are mapped, 
catalogued and analysed appropriately, as shown in Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2. 
The degree to 
which the 
utilities listed 




























































































on the utilities 
listed below 
Electricity 1 2 3 3 3 3 2  2 2 3 3 3 30 
Road  3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 28 
Fuel 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2  2 2 2 27 
Telecoms 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3  25 
Water supply 1 1 1 2  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 16 
VHF radio 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 16 
Storm water 2 1 1 2 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Wastewater 1 1 1 2 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Rail 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Sea transport 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Air transport 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 12 
Broadcasting 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 12 
Figure 1-1: Business as usual infrastructure interdependency matrix (NZLC 2017) 
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are dependent on 
the utilities listed 
below 
Fuel  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3 3 3 36 
Roads  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 34 
Telecoms 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3  31 
Electricity 1 2 3 3 3 3 2  2 2 3 3 3 30 
VHF radio 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2 26 
Broadcasting  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2 2 24 
Air transport 2 1 1  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Water supply 1 1 1 2  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 16 
Storm water 2 1 1 2 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Wastewater 1 1 1 2 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Rail 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Sea transport 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Gas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 12 
Figure 1-2: During/post-disaster interdependency matrix (NZLC 2017)  
A comparison of the above two tables highlight how interdependencies become more 
apparent, as well as highlighting critical infrastructures increasing importance, post disaster. 
Also interpreted from the tables is that risk to a city is not simply an aggregate of each 
building’s risk, but that the urban system as a whole, such as roads and other infrastructure 
lifelines, and the urban spatial pattern, plays an important role in the city’s vulnerability. 
Historically, the recording, managing, and modelling of urban infrastructure has been 
conducted across independent databases, primarily due to policy and technology limitations 
between the various stakeholders (Li et al., 2019; Song and Li, 2017). However, in the area of 
disaster research, organisations such as the International Social Science Council (ISSC), 
International Council for Science (ICSU), and UNISDR recognise the importance of developing 
trans-disciplinary, multi-sectorial alliances for in-depth disaster risk reduction studies, and 
aim to overcome the challenges associated with heterogeneous databases through the 
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) research programme (IRDR, 2013). 
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Of these heterogeneous databases, smart technologies such as Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS), and Building Information Modelling (BIM)-based systems, which contain 
building and infrastructure spatial and attribute data, are examples of more commonly used 
tools for managing large spatial datasets and accurately characterising an urban system. 
Whilst the likes of GIS have a long history and are essential in the management of data and 
assessment of risk, BIM has only been in development since the 1990s (Liu et al., 2017) and 
has predominantly been used for engineering design and asset management. However, whilst 
BIM continues to evolve in its conventional uses of engineering and asset management 
(BIM Acceleration Committee, 2016; Kassem et al., 2015), it is recognised that data contained 
within the models are an equally important resource in the assessment of resilience of the 
built environment. 
The integration of BIM and GIS is an even newer research topic, and despite most of the 
literature highlighting this integration’s potential use as an asset management tool (Boyes et 
al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2009), commonalities and complementary attributes of the systems 
also lend themselves to becoming a crucial application in the characterisation of urban 
resilience and vulnerability. By having access to up-to-date, accurate quantitative citywide 
data, showing a fully integrated model of the lifelines (horizontal infrastructure) and the 
critical sites (vertical infrastructure) they service, provides the ability to assess the 4 Rs and in 
turn demonstrate the progress/success of the Sendai targets set by UNISDR (2015). 
A key example of the impact of a natural hazard on a modern city was the 2010-2011 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which caused extensive damage to Christchurch 
City’s natural and built environments. It is estimated that insurance claims across the 
sequence were in the order of magnitude of NZ$40 billion, making it the fifth largest insurance 
event in the world since 1953 (Deloitte Access Economics, 2015). The main series of 
earthquakes, which spanned approximately 15 months between September 2010 and 
December 2011, caused widespread ground deformation as a result of seismically-induced 
liquefaction (Hughes et al., 2015; Quigley et al., 2016). The manifestations of liquefaction 
during this period caused significant damage to vertical and horizontal infrastructure. 
The comprehensive data gathered during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), 
characterising impacts on the built environment, have provided valuable lessons in disaster 
impact and urban resilience.  
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Learnings from the CES have also contributed to significant development in modelling 
seismicity and impacts to infrastructure lifelines in New Zealand, along with spurring 
development of computational platforms with which to do so. Examples include: the 
3D modelling of physics-based ground motion response, utilising site-specific data from 
16 strong motion stations in Christchurch (de la Torre and Bradley, 2018); the exposure, 
impact, and recovery model of interdependent critical infrastructure in an Alpine Fault Mw 8.0 
(AF8) event (Zorn et al., 2018); and the characterisation of vertical and horizontal ground 
deformation for comparison with the performance of the city’s potable and wastewater 
networks (Bellagamba et al., 2018b; Liu, 2016; O'Rourke et al., 2014). 
Despite GIS and BIM data integration being in its infancy, recent developments in Christchurch 
and New Zealand present the opportunity to research more evolved tools. An example of this 
is the work by Christchurch City Council (CCC) who, following the CES and the ongoing rebuild 
of Christchurch, saw the opportunity provided by integrated BIM and GIS technologies as a 
means to better record, monitor and collate vertical and horizontal infrastructure data. 
In a collaborative project with NextSpace Ltd., a geospatially-referenced platform 
(codenamed Bruce) that provides a single-source viewer of highly detailed BIM data provided 
by designers as part of the consenting process, and their own assets such as the 3 Waters 
network is being developed. This thesis research is improving data sharing and visualisation 
protocols in the Bruce project, and extending its capabilities by integrating the earthquake 
modelling outputs of Bellagamba et al. (2018b). 
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1.2. Conceptual Frameworks 
Two conceptual frameworks are used for the basis of this thesis: risk, and resilience. Table 1 
provides an overview of contrasting approaches to risk and resilience concerning 
infrastructure, demonstrating how the assessment of risk considers likelihood and 
consequence of known, quantifiable hazards; and resilience assessment considers 
unpredictable events with low-probability, high consequence. Whilst the treatment 
classification of risk and resilience are the same in that they both use transfer of responsibility, 
removal, mitigation (improvement), or do nothing approaches, how these strategies are 
implemented differ between the two, as shown in Table 2 from Institute of Public Works 
Engineering Australia [IPWEA] et al. (2015). Further details on each of the frameworks are 
presented in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, with discussion on how aspects of each can be 
integrated through use of a geospatial workflow in Section 1.2.3. 
Table 1: Comparison of risk and resilience (from IPWEA,2015)  
Risk Resilience 
Considers degree of certainty related to the hazard 
likelihood and range of potential consequences. If 
there is significant uncertainty, a “resilience 
approach” should also be used. 
Consideration of over-design events. 
Identification of consequences and 
management procedures following the 
occurrence of an event. 
Consideration of multiple interdependencies related 
to a piece of infrastructure and methods of efficient 
reduction or management should be considered. 
Review and planning of potential failure 
possibilities/modes across interdependencies should 
also be carried out. 
Considers the cost/benefit analysis of 
managed failure due to an unspecified 
cause (e.g. by providing redundant 
systems, safe-failure approaches, given 
the criticality of a specific system or asset. 
Focus on prioritising risk reduction for those 
assessed as being high. 
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Table 2: Comparison of risk and resilience treatments (from Ettouney, 2016) 
Category Risk Resilience 
Transfer Yes (e.g. via insurance) 
Indirectly as part of improving redundancy 
which is a function of mitigation. 
Mitigate 









Ignore Yes Yes 
Remove Yes 
May not be fully removed, as operations 
will always continue. Therefore, removal 
could be considered a mitigation method. 
 
1.2.1. Risk Management 
The Risk Management Framework (New Zealand Standards, 2009) provides a methodological 
approach to handle complex processes associated with risk assessment and eventually risk 
reduction. Through identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment, as shown in Figure 1-3, 











Figure 1-3: Risk Management Framework (New Zealand Standards, 2009) 
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Disaster Risk is expressed by the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management [MCDEM], 2018) in the following equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 × 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 
whereby the equation parameters are defined as: 
i. Risk (Disaster Risk): The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets, 
which could occur to a system, society or community in a specific period, determined 
as a function of hazard, expose, vulnerability and capacity. 
ii. Hazard: A process, phenomenon, or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury 
or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption, or 
environmental degradation. 
iii. Exposure: People, infrastructure, buildings, the economy, and other assets that are 
exposed to a hazard. 
iv. Vulnerability: The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and 
environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, a 
community, assets, or systems to the impacts of hazards. 
v. Capacity: The combination of all the strengths, attributes, and resources available 
within an organisation, community, or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and 
strengthen resilience. 
The research presented in this thesis focusses on the means of undertaking citywide seismic 
risk assessment through digital engineering techniques (predominantly BIM and GIS 
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1.2.2. Resilience Management 
Disaster resilience is determined by the capability of individuals, communities, public and 
private organisations, and is informed by past disasters to reduce risks from future ones, at 
international, regional, national and local levels, without compromising long-term prospects 
for development (Combaz, 2014; UNISDR, 2005). 
Generally, within the literature, disaster resilience is defined as either a function of four or 
five Rs. Ettouney (2016) and Bruneau et al. (2003) refer to 4 Rs, when describing physical and 
social system resilience, as follows: 
1) Robustness: Ability to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering 
degradation or loss of function. 
2) Redundancy: Extent to which elements, systems or other units of analysis are 
substitutable i.e. capable of satisfying functional requirements in event of disruption, 
degradation, or loss of functionality. 
3) Resourcefulness: capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilise 
resources (human and material i.e. monetary, physical, technological, and 
informational) to meet established priorities and achieve goals, when conditions exist 
that threaten to cause disruption. 
4) Rapidity: capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner to contain 
losses and avoid future disruption. 
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Linkov (2015) categorises resilience as a function of 5 Rs, whereby rapidity is subcategorised 
into response and recovery but the remaining three definitions remain the same. 
Ettouney and Alampalli (2016) expand on these definitions by incorporating a Time-Function 
scale whereby Time has an origin beginning with the occurrence of a hazard, and Function is 
a subjective estimate of operational efficiency of the asset, or community of assets. 
The interrelationships between the 4 Rs and the Time-Function variables in the context of 
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Resilience management (Figure 1-5) has historically been defined as the ability to return to 
the status quo after a disturbance event (Hassenzahl, n.d.). However, resilience management 
cannot be based solely on the capability to recover from the types of disasters previously 
faced (learning, or resourcefulness in the context of the 4 Rs), but requires capacity be built 
to avoid damage and/or to recover from likely future disasters (anticipation/rapidity). In order 
to manage resilience, the risks must be understood so that adequate preparation can be 
undertaken through modelling and measurement acquisition (sensing/redundancy), for both 
expected and unexpected events (adaptation/robustness). To that end, it is critical that risks 











 (as a function of time)
Forecasting: Future performance
 (as a function of time)
Resilience Monitoring
Resilience Treatment Resilience Acceptance Communications
 
Figure 1-5: Resilience management (modified from Ettouney, 2016 and Linkov, 2015). Note:- the 
arrows in the figure do not necessarily represent a particular sequence between linked processes.  
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1.2.3. Integrating Risk and Resilience through Digital Engineering 
As discussed in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, risk and resilience are not completely independent. 
Their frameworks are generally comparable (Figure 1-7), with the Risk Management 
Framework showing a more bidirectional workflow than the resilience management 
framework. Linkov et al. (2014) illustrated that risk assessment forms one part of resilience, 
at the point immediately following an event, prior to the recovery (or rapidity in the context 
of the 4 Rs) phase, as shown in Figure 1-6, the definition of Capacity by MCDEM (2018) 
directly references resilience. 
 
Figure 1-6: Resilience Management Framework with risk analysis as a central component (from Linkov 
et al., 2014) 
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Similar relationships between risk and resilience can be seen when assessing the components 
of each framework, as presented in Figure 1-8. In the context of risk management, 
Suter (2011) noted how resilience replaces/complements the concept of protection, 
previously defined as the goal of risk management activities. Resilience also forms part of risk 
management whereby it is required to mitigate the residual risks remaining from those 
unidentified or underestimated, and therefore not covered by preventative measures 
adopted as part of the Risk Management Framework. Lastly, referring back to some of the 
contrasting dynamics between the two frameworks, resilience presents an alternative to the 
traditional method of risk management by way of dealing with risks in a complex 
environment. In particular, with socio-economic systems that are confronted with highly 
complex non-linear and dynamic risks through which, their resilience should be enhanced by 




Robustness Resourcefulness Recovery Redundancy
 
Figure 1-8: Relationships between risk and resilience components (modified from Ettouney and 
Alampalli, 2016). Dashed lines represent unidirectional relationship. 
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The interrelationship between risk and resilience is further demonstrated by way of the 
graphics in Figure 1-9 whereby the Time-Function scale from Ettouney and Alampalli (2016) is 
considered. The graphs show how traditional risk management, with the absence of 
resilience, (graphs c and d) result in a lengthy recovery period relative to the degree of risk. 
However, where resilience management is considered (graphs a and b), there is an additional 
emphasis on decreasing the recovery time and facilitating adaptation. 
 
Figure 1-9: Graphical representation of risk versus resilience (from Linkov et al., 2014) . 
In the context of the research presented in this thesis, the purpose is to develop a workflow 
to aid in a citywide seismic risk assessment through digital engineering techniques 
(predominantly BIM and GIS technologies) and provide the means for integrating the risk and 
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As shown in Figure 1-7, there are three predominant processes within risk and resilience 
management: context establishment/resilience acceptance, assessment, and treatment. 
These are supplemented by communication and consultation, and monitoring and review. 
The context establishment/resilience acceptance component of this research is presented in 
Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Assessment is required as part of the second process in risk and 
resilience management. Risk assessment includes identification, analysis, and evaluation of 
risk, and considers the extent and vulnerability of the exposed assets. Resilience assessment 
reviews past performance under similar hazardous events through learning and adaptation, 
and forecasts future performance through anticipation and sensing (Figure 1-5). 
Risk identification from the perspective of this study requires recognition of potential seismic 
hazards within a defined area. Additionally, the exposure (e.g. buildings and horizontal 
infrastructure) at risk from the hazard also need to be catalogued. This process is achieved 
through a literature review of: existing seismic modelling of the CES (Section 2.3.3), reviewing 
the performance of building and infrastructure during the CES (Sections 2.3.3.3 and 2.3.3.4), 
and integration methodologies of digital building and infrastructure data (Section 2.2.4). 
The analysis conducted here is via the integration of vertical and horizontal infrastructure 
data into a geospatial platform to allow identification of risk of service loss. Data extracted 
from the Bruce platform was analysed using the Bellagamba et al. (2018b) serviceability loss 
model that is based on quantitative analysis using probabilistic modelling utilising 
potable water network performance data during the CES. 
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Risk evaluation assesses risks and establishes methods to minimise hazard impact and 
therefore reduce the risk. Levels of risk as defined by Layfield and Great Britain. Dept. of 
Energy (1987) can be either acceptable, tolerable, or intolerable and are essential in the 
assessment of risk treatment. Evaluation assists in the development and amendment of 
strategic planning and decision making as it allows for the prioritisation of resources in the 
reduction of intolerable risks. Modelling also provides the means of evaluating alternative 
scenarios and designs of buildings and infrastructure, and the impacts from a seismic event. 
The “trending” component of resilience assessment weaves itself through the risk assessment 
described above. In the context of this thesis, the damage observations gathered throughout 
the CES of both land and the built environment enabled the wider infrastructure community 
(engineers, policy makers, private insurers, contractors) to learn about the performance of 
land and infrastructure when subjected to shaking and permanent ground deformation. 
These observations and subsequent risk analyses informed new Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment (MBIE) Guidelines, a set of requirements for building 
foundations designed for earthquake events comparable to, and of greater magnitude, than 
that experienced during the CES (MBIE, 2012). The development of these guidelines is also an 
example of resourcefulness in the context of the 4 Rs. The observations made for the case 
study site in Chapter 4 also provided the ability to adapt and design a new, more robust sports 
facility that should perform better than its predecessor, a hypothesis explored as part of the 
analytical component of this thesis. 
The final phase in the Risk Management Framework is risk treatment, which identifies the 
means to lessen vulnerability of the exposure, reduce the hazard, or both. 
Mitigation strategies can also be applied to aid in the reduction of risk such as engineered 
options (e.g. infrastructure strengthening) or through non-engineered solutions (e.g. asset 
relocation, modifying land-use, and monitoring). To determine the impact of risk reduction 
requires forecasting of future performance, the second half of the resilience assessment 
component of the resilience framework.  
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For this study, the focus is on engineered solutions whereby a comparison is made between: 
a pre-CES building and its servicing infrastructure and their performance during the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake; and the new building and infrastructure built at 
the same site following the CES. This demonstrates the sensing component of the resilience 
framework by modelling expected performance of an asset before an event occurring 
(redundancy in accordance with the 4 Rs). This thesis demonstrates one scenario (an event of 
equal magnitude to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake). However, the benefit 
to the geospatial workflow and the serviceability loss model is that reiterative simulations 
could be run for a variety of scenarios. From these results, asset owners could undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis of concept improvement works to determine the degree of risk is 
acceptable, tolerable, or intolerable (Layfield and Great Britain. Dept. of Energy, 1987), and 
determine the capacity of the asset (or response and recovery in the context of the 5 Rs).  
The supplementary component of monitoring and reviewing provides the means to calibrate 
and update models as new data become available. This is one of the fundamental principles 
of this thesis, whereby the proposed workflow allows for the continual uploading of both new 
building and infrastructure data, or where external analysis is conducted and its outputs fed 
back into the integrated Bruce platform (also demonstrating learning and resourcefulness in 
the resilience framework). 
Communication and consultation through the integrated Bruce platform allows stakeholders 
to identify requirements of risk management organisations and communities. The intent of 
the platform is to provide a single-source database that all lifeline and asset owners, and local 
authorities, can contribute to and assess risk at a citywide level through external modelling. 
This allows for the provision of risk reduction options through determining the current 
resilience of the built environment.   
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1.3. Thesis Outline 
1.3.1. Project Objective 
The objective of this research is to demonstrate a workflow of integrating geospatially (GIS) 
and non-geospatially referenced (BIM) data into a unified, geospatial, web-based platform, 
and to highlight its capabilities as a research tool.  
Whilst Smart Cities and Digital Twins are continually being researched as a means of asset 
management (Section 2.2.5.4), the CES and ongoing work associated with an AF8 event 
(MCDEM, 2019) have highlighted the importance of having easily accessible and accurate data 
for preparatory analysis and risk modelling, prior to an event. To that end, the following 
research aims have been developed to identify the workflow required to obtain 
easily accessible data for urban resilience analysis: 
 Categorise the current uses of BIM and GIS. 
 Identify the current difficulties with integrating BIM and GIS data. 
 Discuss how integrated data benefits urban resilience analysis of the built environment. 
 Identify the roles/users best placed for managing and co-ordinating citywide datasets as well 
as providing access to, for a variety of stakeholders. 
 Demonstrate the seamless extraction of up-to-date BIM and GIS infrastructure data stored 
and managed within Bruce. 
 Present a demonstration of the geospatial workflow in an earthquake analysis of 
infrastructure lifeline performance. 
To achieve these aims, a literature review focussing on BIM and GIS was conducted to identify 
current methodologies of integration and their associated challenges. GIS data of the 
3 Waters infrastructure and as-built BIM Data for the case study site were provided by CCC 
and with the assistance of NextSpace Ltd and their current version of Bruce; a workflow was 
developed to integrate GIS and BIM data. The workflow functionality is extended by 
demonstrating how typical data held within the integrated tool are used in the serviceability 
loss model developed by Bellagamba et al. (2018b). Finally, a review of future needs and 
applications outside of those included in this thesis is discussed. 
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1.3.2. Thesis Structure 
This study is organised into four main chapters. Chapter 2 provides the results of the literature 
review, which identified previous studies on the uses and integration techniques associated 
with GIS and BIM, including existing applications for hazard analysis. An overview of the 
geological and seismic conditions of Christchurch, as well as a summary on the performance 
of the vertical and horizontal infrastructure during the CES, is also presented. 
Chapter 3 presents the developed geospatial workflow, utilising two tools. First, a web-based 
BIM-GIS integration platform (codenamed Bruce) under development by NextSpace Limited, 
for collecting building and infrastructure data. Second, a serviceability loss model developed 
by Bellagamba et al. (2018b), which was used to model performance of the potable water 
network during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. The chapter also highlights 
the workflow to collate relevant building and infrastructure data from the NextSpace model, 
and the method for inputting these data into the loss model. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the application of the workflow by means of a case study. 
Vertical and horizontal infrastructure data provided by CCC for the Taiora: QEII recreation and 
sports centre were uploaded and integrated into Bruce. A tailored metadata extraction was 
then completed to demonstrate the extension of the workflow. The extraction was tailored 
to the requirements of the serviceability loss model so that a comparison could be undertaken 
between the performance of the pre-CES QEII building and associated infrastructure 
(from Bellagamba et al., 2018b) with the new Taiora: QEII infrastructure, using the ground 
deformation data from the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. The conclusion of 
this section presents the various outputs and results of the case study. 
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses recommendations for the further development of the Bruce tool, 
such as the addition of other lifeline networks, and the generation of alternative modelled 
seismic events (such as AF8, MCDEM, 2019) to assess the performance of the infrastructure 
systems in areas of liquefiable soils. It will also identify the benefits of other outputs for 
stakeholders such as MCDEM for hazard analysis and response planning, for asset managers 
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This research collates building data managed by CCC, characterises the spatial distribution 
and causative mechanisms of damage to horizontal infrastructure, and then applies the 
learnings to case study site. Damage to infrastructure lifelines networks during the CES is well 
documented in the literature, as is the development of GIS databases for the use of horizontal 
infrastructure risk analysis and modelling of various seismic hazard scenarios. Studies have 
been undertaken to identify relationships between the infrastructure networks, their 
geographical environment, and the resulting impacts from natural hazard events, along with 
management and restoration of those networks with the goal of improving physical asset and 
community resilience.  
However, there is a gap in research linking BIM and GIS data for horizontal and vertical 
infrastructure systems, and their integrated use in risk and resilience analysis appears to be a 
relatively a new field. Most current studies focus on methods of integration, rather than their 
uses in analysis and modelling, particularly for natural hazards. This section reviews the key 
published works documenting the uses of BIM and GIS, previous attempts at integrating the 
two, the applications of the integration, and existing examples of digital cities both 
internationally and within New Zealand. The second half of this chapter describes impacts of 
the CES on Christchurch City’s built environment, as a background to the case study analysis 





2.2. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) 
2.2.1. GIS  
GIS have a long history. One of the first examples of “GIS” dates back to 1854 with John Snow’s 
mapping of Cholera outbreaks in London, whereby he identified the trend of outbreaks 
occurring along water lines (and subsequently becoming the birth of spatial analysis) 
(GISGeography, 2018). With the rapid improvement in technology in recent times, GIS are 
essential in the management of large spatial datasets, accurate characterisation of urban 
systems, and risk assessment. They are designed for capturing, storing, analysing, managing, 
and displaying detailed geospatial information (such as topography and building and 
infrastructure attribute data) using a particular geographic reference system (Amirebrahimi 
et al., 2015; Esri, 2018; Fazal, 2008; Fosu et al., 2015; GISGeography, 2019b). The transference 
of geospatial data and interoperability between systems are organised using the Geographic 
Markup Language (GML), an Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standard data model for 
defining data types and describing geographic features. 
Applications using GIS include remote sensing, land surveying, and geography; however, 
some sources claim anywhere between 28 and 1000 uses ("67 Important GIS Applications and 
Uses", 2015; GISGeography, 2019a; Landis, n.d.)."Major areas of GIS application" (n.d.) has 
grouped these uses into five main fields as shown in Table 3. Despite this thesis focussing on 
uses in asset/facilities management and environment and natural resources management, all 
fields in Table 3 are discussed throughout this research, as they are all key criteria in the 





Table 3: Classification of main GIS uses (from "Major areas of GIS application", n.d.) 
Field Application 
Facilities and Asset management 
 Buried utility location 
 Facility maintenance planning 
 Telecommunication network services 
 Planning and monitoring of energy consumption  
Environment and natural resources 
management 
 Agricultural land planning, forest management 
 Water resource management 
 Environmental impact analysis 
 Disaster management and risk mitigation 
 Waste facility site location analysis 
Street network 
 Traffic management 
 Emergency response  
 Transport planning 
Planning and engineering 
 Urban planning 
 Regional planning 
 Infrastructure feasibility studies 
Land information system 
 Cadastre administration 
 Taxation 
 Land use zoning 
 Land acquisition 
 
Natural hazards are characterised by their intensity, location, and return period. 
The occurrence of a disaster from a natural hazard is governed by many factors, and the 
spatial information associated with these factors is crucial to risk assessment and resilience 
management (Section 1.2.1). Therefore, the analysis of natural hazard impacts greatly 
benefits from GIS, as it assesses the intersection of hazards and associated risks. 
This is achieved through use of geographical datasets such as topography, land use, 
infrastructure, and human/cultural, which aid in the assessment of hazard intensity, exposure 
and vulnerability of things and people, and therefore potential disaster risks. 
Biophysical datasets (e.g. landslide, flood, sea-level rise, earthquake, fire) gathered through 
predictive modelling or historic records help characterise hazards and evaluate degree of risk 
imposed on assets (Gunes and Kovel, 2000; Tarolli and Cavalli, 2013; Vatseva et al., 2013). 
Attributes of asset datasets such as population age, transport links (i.e. road access, 
alternative route options, location of emergency services), building age, and utility age and 
topology, can be analysed to understand vulnerability to a disaster (Johnson, 2000; Van 





GIS also offers the ability to carry out risk analysis utilising the datasets. By overlaying or 
intersecting the geographical and biophysical layers of information identified above, it 
provides the means to estimate the degree of risk, pinpointing areas that may be at high risk 
of exposure to extreme conditions, such as densely populated regions or old and fragile 
lifelines. Specific examples of this type of analysis include; the multi-hazard 
(flooding, landslides and earthquake) risk assessment of Costa Rica (Van Westen et al., 2002) 
and seismic risk analyses by Cubellis and Carlino (2004); Nath (2005); Selçuk and 
Yücemen (2000). Flood analysis by Schulte and Coors (2009) used CityGML (discussed further 
in Section 2.2.3) to model water bodies in flood analysis; however, the water bodies were 
only 3D visualisations and did not include other vector-based metadata (such as velocity and 
temporal dynamics). These limitations extend into the representation of 3D buildings in 
CityGML and their lack of metadata, preventing CityGML’s effective use for hazard analysis. 
Further discussion on the use and comparisons of CityGML with BIM are presented in 
Section 2.2.3. 
Post-disaster, the response and recovery phases of risk management can also utilise GIS 
technologies, and the lessons captured during these phases aid in the trending component of 
resilience management as per Figure 1-5. Remote sensing using visible and near-infrared 
channels and GIS can quickly estimate the extent of a flood, delineate landslides, and in some 
cases identify damaged buildings and roads if high-resolution images are available (Tarolli and 
Cavalli, 2013; Vatseva et al., 2013; Zerger, 2002). Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) 
techniques can be used to measure ground deformation after an earthquake, such as was 
conducted in Christchurch following the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) 
(Hughes et al., 2015; see Section 2.3.3.2). Emergency and first responders rely on GIS and 
Geographic Projection Systems (GPS) to efficiently reach affected locations, monitor 
disruptions to the road networks and find alternative routes, and utilise census data in the 
determination of population densities that are likely to be the most adversely affected (Gunes 
and Kovel, 2000; Johnson, 2000; Rich and Davis, 2010). Using lessons learned from disasters 
can guide land use planning to restrict development in certain places (i.e. the 
Residential  Red Zone in Christchurch, discussed in Section 2.3.3.4), or engineering civil works 
to withstand greater natural forces, such as those recommended by MBIE (2012) following 
the CES. Catalogues of historic events provide crucial information, especially when they are 




Asset management (AM) requires not only having visibility of asset location, but also knowing 
its performance. Given that all assets have a geospatial location, mapping provides the most 
effective method of cataloguing; however, this only offers a simple geographical inventory. 
The combination of geospatial location with other datasets in a GIS offers the ability for 
deeper analysis as shown in Figure 2-1. However, according to Hurley (2018), 80% of asset 
managers do not effectively use GIS, and so have incomplete visibility of the AM components 
in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1: Asset Management components 
Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh (2018) demonstrated the implementation of GIS in AM using the 
Western Michigan University (WMU), USA, as a case study. By undertaking a data collection 
and conversion exercise of the WMU campus assets (e.g. buildings, pavements, utilities) in 
ArcGIS server manager, risk management and condition assessment approaches were 
developed for defining strategies for operations and capital maintenance. By implementing 
the condition index and risk assessment methodologies, prioritisation maps for wastewater 
manholes and mains were produced, as shown in Figure 2-2. 
 














Schultz (2012) further developed the AM and GIS integration research by Al-Kasisbeh and 
Abudayyeh (2018), by providing a method for mapping existing AM databases to a developed 
GIS database for the Otay Water District (OWD), USA. Mapping was achieved using relational 
database management system (RDBMS) Sequential Query Language (SQL) statements. 
Results from mapping allowed grouping of vertical assets in the asset management system 
(such as pipes, values, and engines) to their associated pump station, and assigned these as 
point features in the GIS model. The integrated databases allowed risk and resilience metrics 
to be developed, similar to the analysis by Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh (2018). However, in 
the case of the OWD, the two assessment criteria to test the GIS model were 
criticality/consequence of failure, i.e. combination of vulnerability and robustness, while also 
considering redundancy (from Section 1.2), and probability of failure (based on condition and 
age of asset). 
Where Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh (2018) and Schultz (2012) predominantly focussed on the 
integration and assessment of single-sector infrastructure, Bhamidipati et al. (2016) noted 
that hazards are not selective of the assets they impact, and so they investigated the means 
to develop an interconnected infrastructure model. Interconnectedness differs from 
interdependency, whereby the former is defined as a physical linking of systems but with 
unidirectional relationships. Interdependency is symbiotic in nature with bidirectional 
relationships i.e. how the relationships in a city’s digital twin would operate (Section 2.2.5.4). 
However, Bhamidipati et al. (2016) presented examples of interconnected relationships that 
would still benefit from such analysis of a GIS-based AM system, such as modelling electrical 
distribution networks providing power to water distribution and pumping stations 
(cross-sector), and network infrastructure flow patterns transitioning from high to low 
capacity (single-sector). Also in contrast to Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh (2018) and 
Schultz (2012), who both dealt with vulnerability, reliability, and robustness, 
Bhamidipati et al. (2016) proposed a GIS-based AM system, prioritising the requirements of 
an asset manager (i.e. maintenance and replacement assessment) through the use of GIS and 





The adopted layering approach of each asset in Bhamidipati et al. (2016) meant that as each 
layer increases in data, individual asset layers could be improved further without affecting 
other connected asset layers. Similarly, individual layers can be weighted based on their 
importance relative to other layers. A small area of North Rotterdam in The Netherlands was 
tested against a flood event scenario in three separate experiments of varying degrees of 
interconnectedness. The results highlighted the additional impacts caused to the road assets 
when factoring in other interconnected assets such as sewer and electricity. This presents a 
significant analytical tool for asset managers, enabling them to become more aware of 
vulnerabilities from the condition of other connected assets. Having an integrated platform 
that all asset managers can access and provide input to (such as a citywide digital twin 
discussed in Section 2.2.5.4) enables greater collaboration, and is essential in the budgeting 
and prioritisation of maintenance works components (Figure 2-1). 
The above asset management examples demonstrate that with the use of GIS, organisations 
are able to: 
 Identify preventive maintenance requirements (forecasting through the resilience 
framework in Section 1.2.2), 
 Estimate asset lifecycle more accurately, 
 Adopt a preparedness approach to faulting of assets (anticipation component of 
Figure 1-5) (Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh, 2018; Schultz, 2012), 
 Determine vulnerability caused by faulting (such as number of affected customers 
through loss of service) (Schultz, 2012), 







Unlike GIS, which has had a long evolution, BIM has only been in development since the 1990s 
(Liu et al., 2017) and has predominantly been used for engineering design and asset 
management. During the lifecycle of a building project, stakeholders such as Architects, 
Engineers, Construction, and Operations and Facility Management (AECOFM) all have varying 
degrees of involvement and input, so a system was needed to improve the effectiveness in 
exchange of information; hence the development of BIM. BIM provides the means of 
recording geometric and semantic building information in a highly detailed model, and is a 
tool for capturing a project workflow. Its means as a tool for integration, interoperability, and 
process automation for construction projects further demonstrates its usefulness within 
industry. BuildingSMART (n.d.-b) defines BIM as “a digital representation of physical and 
functional characteristics of a facility. A building information model is a shared knowledge 
resource for information about a facility, forming a reliable basis for decisions during its 
life-cycle; defined as existing from earliest conception to demolition.” BIM is an intelligent 
3D model-based process that gives AECOFM professionals the insight and tools to more 
efficiently plan, design, construct, and manage buildings and infrastructure (Autodesk, 2018). 
The cost and schedule aspects of a BIM are not only beneficial during the design and 
construction phase, but also upon project completion during the facilities/operations and 
maintenance (FM/OM) phase (Kurwi et al., 2017). Studies have shown that traditional 
paper-based methods and a lack of interoperable model-based applications contribute to 
total life-cycle FM/OM costs being three times higher than construction costs, and accounts 
for two-thirds of the total cost (Yalcinkaya and Singh, 2014). Current non-digital handover 
practices from construction to FM/OM phase often result in the delivery of incomplete, 
out-of-date, and unstructured data, and is a costly and time-consuming process 
(Patacas et al., 2015). Equally, common organisation and maintenance of FM data are 
dispersed through several information systems, arrive from different sources, are created and 
manipulated numerous times through the asset life-cycle, and are unsynchronised between 
systems, often resulting in error-prone processes. BIM provides a centralised database for 
information transferral between the design, construct, and FM/OM phases (Becerik-Gerber 




During the FM/OM phase, BIM enables asset managers to proactively track the facility/asset, 
hand information from one contractor to another, and schedule maintenance and review 
maintenance history. However, upon review of literature, BIM use in FM/OM is in its infancy. 
For example, Kivits and Furneaux (2013) list 13 projects that had adopted BIM in at least one 
phase of the infrastructure life-cycle, and of those 13, only four made reference to facilities 
or asset management, the remainder were used predominantly during the design phase. 
Similarly, Pocock et al. (2014) recognised that current industry perception is that BIM and AM 
are isolated practices, and so provided recommendations identifying the key benefits to 
integrating the two such as: 
 Government and engineering professional bodies taking a “whole life-whole system-
whole industry” approach in the further development of BIM and AM standards, 
 Raise awareness of the need to develop BIM and AM in organisations in an integrated 
way through established channels and promote training programmes and professional 
qualifications to develop the required competencies, 
 Develop and embed enterprise-wide information systems and processes combining 
BIM and AM in compliance with emerging BIM and AM standards to ensure consistent 
application across all planning, projects, and FM/OM functions, 
 Develop appropriate client requirements for BIM and AM and communicate these to 
the supply chain, 
 Take a phased approach to extending BIM for existing assets prioritised by asset 
criticality. 
Research has been undertaken to develop systems to overcome the disparity between BIM 
and FM/OM information and integrate them in a unified database including knowledge-based 
BIM systems and cloud environments (Jiao et al., 2013; Wang and Xie, 2002; Zou et al., 2017). 
Yalcinkaya and Singh (2014) recognised that even with the integration of BIM and FM as a 
virtual database application, for operational success BIM cannot collect and transfer facility 
data on its own. Therefore, the use of other smart technologies such as radio frequency 
identification (RFID) and other wireless sensors (Ko, 2009; Shen et al., 2012) contribute to the 
creation of a digital twin (section2.2.5.4), providing the means to track and monitor assets 




Regarding the use of BIM for risk management, Zou et al. (2017) provided a table from their 
own literature review, in which the significant majority of cases were grouped into four 
categories; project management, design, construction (including health and safety), and 
FM/OM. The table also presented examples of the benefits under two themes: “Research”, 
and “Practice”. Of particular note is a lack of citation for a “Practice” example for the FM/OM 
category, further cementing the notion that the use of BIM in this phase of project life-cycle 
is in early development. There was only one example of BIM use for performance analysis of 
a bridge design; no other examples of risk assessment of natural hazards were identified. 
Table 4 presents a modified version of Zou et al. (2017), supplemented with other literature; 
it incorporates identified examples of BIM use in natural hazard risk assessment. 
It is clear from the literature that the focus of BIM research and development has been biased 
toward evolution and standardisation in the engineering and design aspects of the project 
life-cycle. Pocock et al. (2014) and Kivits and Furneaux (2013) recognised the potential of BIM 
as an FM/OM tool, but acknowledged this application is still in its infancy and there are few 
case studies of its adoption in the industry. Equally, this literature review has identified few 
cases where BIM has been used in disaster and hazard management. However, a 
commonly-identified theme was that BIM’s potential significantly increases when linked with 
other existing tools and systems, such as sensor technology in the FM/OM phase of a project 
life-cycle (Jiao et al., 2013; Wang and Xie, 2002; Zou et al., 2017), and with GIS in the design 





Table 4: Examples of BIM for risk management (modified from Zou et al., 2017) 
Category Functionality Benefit for risk management 
Project 
management 
Interoperability Reducing information loss of data exchange 
Collaboration and 
communication facilitation 




Facilitating early risk identification and risk 
communication 
5D Cost estimation or cash 
flow modelling 




Facilitating early risk identification and risk 
communication 
Clash detection Automation of detecting physical conflicts in model 
Urban planning and design 
Integrating planning and design of urban space and 
AEC projects; facilitating land-use planning, design 
and management 
Space management 
Improving the consideration of space distribution 
and management in design 
Code compliance 
Use of automatic rule checking technologies to 
ensure design complies with building costs and 
regulatory authorities (Eastman et al., 2009) 
Hazard 
Assessment 
Structural analysis Improving structural safety 
Detailed internal room 
layout 
Disaster risk management (flow paths of mud/lava, 
identification of social conditions for exposure and 
vulnerability components of risk assessment) 
(Kemec et al., 2012) 
Damage assessment 
Damage estimation to assist in cost estimating and 
scheduling for post-disaster rehabilitation (Alirezaei 
et al., 2016; Charalambos et al., 2014) 




Improvement management level for quality, safety, 
time, and budget 
Safety management Reducing personnel safety hazards 
Risk scenario planning Reducing personnel safety hazards 
Quality control Improving construction quality 






2.2.3. Comparison of GIS and BIM 
Although the examples presented in Section 2.2.1 demonstrate applications of pure GIS in 
asset and facilities management, many of the examples have direct linkages with BIM, in 
either a direct translation of BIM to GIS (vertical assets captured in Al-Kasisbeh and 
Abudayyeh, 2018), or complementary dynamics between GIS and BIM systems 
(interconnected infrastructure in Bhamidipati et al., 2016). Although the main functionality of 
both BIM and GIS is to create digital representations of the real world, they were developed 
as solutions for different problems in different domains. Where GIS is used generally at a 
macro-level in the real world (e.g. terrain, river, land parcels, “outdoor” data), BIM is in a 
relatively micro-level of detail e.g. buildings and “indoor” data. Table 5 summarises the key 
features of both GIS and BIM, highlighting areas of comparability and areas of conflict; further 
discussion regarding each of the features is below. Liu et al. (2017) recognised macro-scale 
areas of overlap between BIM and GIS, as shown in Figure 2-3. 
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































i. Standard: Generally for buildings, Industry Foundation Class (IFC) is the predominant 
standard for BIM developed by the AIA/buildingSMART whose goal is to specify a 
common language for technology to improve communication, delivery time, cost, and 
quality throughout the whole project life-cycle (Isikdag and Zlatanova, 2009). 
Each “class” represents a range of elements that have common characteristics as 
shown by the class “IfcBuildingElements” in Figure 2-4. The six BIM Level of 
Development (LOD) categories shown in Table 5 are taken from the AIA protocol form 
(AIA, 2019), as it is likely the best-known and most commonly-used worldwide 
(Renehan, 2016). Renehan (2016) presented a summary of other LOD schemas used 
internationally, including the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) – international, the 
developers of CityGML. The intent of CityGML is to represent large- and small-scale 
regions of both terrain and 3D objects in simultaneous levels of detail. It defines 
classes and relationships for topographic objects in cities and regional models with 
respect to their geometry, topology, appearance, and semantic properties. Objects in 
CityGML are not limited to built structures, but also include elevation, vegetation, 
water bodies, and “city furniture” e.g. street lights, public telephone boxes, benches 
("Citygml wiki", 2017). 
ii. Resolution: BIM and GIS have similar specifications for degree of resolution from their 
corresponding standards. An increase in BIM resolution provides a higher degree of 
accuracy of building elements and the associated dimensional data for a single 
building i.e. it is not until LOD300 whereby a model is no longer considered an 
estimate. GIS, however, transitions from macro- to micro-scale of the built and natural 
environment with an increase in resolution. Visual representations of buildings at 
LOD4 and LOD300 (or higher) are generally comparable, as shown in Figure 2-5. 
However, IFC contains more numerical data on measurable quantities and 
relationships between elements, particularly in the model of building interiors. 
There are other common dissimilarities and mismatches between IFC and CityGML, 
such as CityGML representing a wall as a surface for each room separately, whilst IFC 
treats a wall as a volume object shared between rooms and the exterior shell 
(Figure 2-6). As a result, the conversion and integration of one to the other is not easy 




iii. Scale: Both GIS and BIM provide heterogeneous models, with the former usually 
separated into architectural, structural, and Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing (MEP) 
models, the latter representing buildings, transport, vegetation and water bodies. 
However, the key difference identified in Table 5 is that BIM represents a single 
building and its associated infrastructure, whereas GIS can cover much larger areas 
representing many objects. Therefore, GIS with its broader built environment view 
and means of geovisualisation-based decision making and geospatial modelling, is 
essential for data management in modern construction (Song and Li, 2017). 
As discussed in Table 5, CityGML has no means of representing utilities in the same 
manner that BIM does. However, a range of Application Domain Extensions (ADEs) 
have been developed to improve CityGML’s functionality such as 
“CityGML UtilityNetworkADE” (Hijazi et al., 2011), a topic further discussed in 
Section 2.2.5.1. 
iv. Concept: Generally, GIS and BIM attempt to overcome the same issue in their goal to 
be a centralised database, or group of linked databases, that can capture, store, 
manage and disseminate information whilst providing a visual output. A current 
detrimental similarity between GIS and BIM is their incomplete ability to transition 
through a whole project life-cycle (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), particularly in the FM/OM 
phase, where the integration of sensor technology with both GIS and BIM is a relatively 
new field of research. The key differences however, as explained previously, is that 
BIM operates at a micro-scale compared to the larger spatial datasets that GIS can 
manage. Also, based on the available literature presented in Section 2.2.1, GIS appears 
to be more advanced in its ability and use in risk assessment for natural hazards 
(Cubellis and Carlino, 2004; Nath, 2005; Schulte and Coors, 2009; Selçuk and Yücemen, 
2000), and consequential risk caused by failure of assets in the same or interconnected 
topological networks (Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh, 2018; Bhamidipati et al., 2016; 





v. Accuracy: The mismatch between BIM and GIS (pre-construction versus as-built) is 
another challenge, which needs to be overcome. Fosu et al. (2015) acknowledged this 
challenge, particularly where older buildings with non-existent or less accurate 
building plan information are present. However, as is discussed in Section 2.2.5.1, 
Yang et al. (2012), Centofanti et al. (2011), SanJosé-Alonso et al. (2009), and 
Dore and Murphy (2012) have presented methods to retrospectively capture digital 
information for heritage buildings. For new buildings developed in BIM, the 
implementation of an LOD500 model would provide an as-built version and close the 
gap between GIS and BIM representations of buildings. However, along with few 
demonstrable cases of LOD500 models in the literature, there is no mandated 
Quality Assurance (QA) process in place, particularly in New Zealand, to validate a 
LOD500 model with its real world counterpart. This challenge also affects the 
transition of data during the project life-cycle to the FM/OM phase and reduces the 
accuracy of a digital twin (Section 2.2.5.4). 
The above shows many of the existing characteristics of GIS and BIM are comparable and 
interoperable. Whilst it has been recognised that there have been developments in improving 
GIS and BIM separately, in their functionality for use in the whole project life-cycle, there are 
still several gaps, particularly between the design and construction phases, and construction 
and FM/OM phases. The research by Bhamidipati et al. (2016), in the development of 
interconnected and interdependent relationships, is a key basis for integrating GIS and BIM 
technologies by increasing the number of semantic properties between building and utilities. 
The following sections further explore methods of integrating GIS and BIM that form the basis 





Figure 2-4: Excerpt of IfcBuildingElement schema (from BuildingSMART, n.d.-a) 
 
Figure 2-5: Interior room layout comparison of LOD400 (a) and LOD4 (b) from "Marvelous Design Revit 
House Plans..." (2018) and "About Level of Details" (2016), respectively 
 







2.2.4. Methods of GIS and BIM Integration 
As demonstrated in the previous Sections, there is a substantial amount of research in the 
fields of GIS and BIM independently of one another, each with their own strengths and 
weaknesses. The complementary nature of information provided by GIS and BIM highlights 
the usefulness of their potential integration, bridging the gap between the macro-scale 
environment and detailed building data at micro-scale, offering a large quantity of 
information from GIS to detailed information in BIM. Furthermore, the use of an integrated 
GIS and BIM system for urban management tasks and processes throughout a project 
life-cycle provide high efficiency through knowledge capture and continuous analysis of work, 
resulting in increased productivity in the AECOFM industry. Integrating BIM with GIS is not a 
novel idea (Fosu et al., 2015) and with the continuing evolution of GIS and BIM in their 
conventional uses of engineering and asset management (BIM Acceleration Committee, 
2016; Kassem et al., 2015), the data contained within the models are an equally important 
resource in the assessment of resilience of the built environment (Section 2.2.5).  
When combining GIS and BIM, Liu et al. (2017) used the term “Effectiveness, Extensibility, 
Effort, and Flexibility” (EEEF) to describe the method of selecting parameters of interest. 
They recognised that success of an integrated system hinges on openness and collaboration, 
which can be achieved by (i) being demand driven through, (e.g. the Smart City development, 
Ma and Ren, 2017), discussed further in Section 2.2.5.4), (ii) frequent communication, and 





Existing integration methods have been categorised into three main groups (Amirebrahimi et 
al., 2015; Fosu et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2017):  
1) Data level (New standards and models, and conversion, translation and extension of 
existing standards) – e.g. Standard for interoperability between GIS and BIM for land 
and infrastructure (Aien et al., 2015), or creation of Unified Building Models (UBMs) 
(de Laat and Van Berlo, 2011; El-Mekawy et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
2) Process level (semantic web technologies and service-based methods) – e.g. use of a 
reference ontology to take a global view of domains through extending and 
specialising existing ontologies (Amirebrahimi et al., 2015), and open web viewers that 
convert BIM and GIS data for web visualisation (Hagedorn and Döllner, 2007; Lapierre 
and Cote, 2007). 
3) Application level – existing GIS or BIM tools are either modified or rebuilt to include 
the functionality of the other. Data are extracted for a specific use, saved locally, and 
manipulated manually.  
The Process and Application levels generally result in the least data loss and provide the 
means to derive elements and objects from either format. Table 6 summarises the main 
integration methods, the benefits and drawbacks to each, and scores them based on the EEEF 
criteria. Examples of each of the three categories are presented in subsequent sections. 
The development of CityGML by the OGC closes the gap between the two languages of BIM 
and GIS, which represents a significant step towards the use of GIS data in a BIM platform. 
Similarly, IndoorGML complements the existing IFC and CityGML LOD4 standards. This system 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2.4.1. Data level 
The OGC and buildingSMART International proposed a new standard of IFC interoperability 
with CityGML named InfraGML, a successor to LandXML. The new specification will look 
specifically at Computer Aided Design (CAD)-GIS-BIM integration, defining the requirements 
for bridging the data models and workflows between the AECOFM and geospatial 
communities. InfraGML covers area of land development and civil engineering infrastructure 
facilities, with potential to include transport networks, terrain, land parcels, drainage, 
wastewater and water distribution systems in the future (Aien et al., 2015). 
One of the semi-automatic ways to convert/translate GIS and BIM data are through the 
Extract Transform Load (ETL) process. Homogenous data are extracted from the source 
system and loaded by transformation into an appropriate format and structure to a data 
warehouse. To improve efficiency, geometry is also processed by ETL before being 
represented in the integrated system (Kang and Hong, 2013). The process often begins with 
geometry conversion, followed by Global ID allocation used to automate semantic 
translation. Translation is achieved through schema mapping to a data format the destination 
can recognise (Kang and Hong, 2015; Rafiee et al., 2014). 
2.2.4.2. Process level 
Deng et al. (2016) used an instance-based method that compares instances from the IFC and 
CityGML schema and generated mapping rules between the two, based on inspection of 
entities representing the same components in the same model. A reference ontology 
(Semantic City Model ADE) was developed to act as the intermediary between the IFC and 
CityGML schema structures and capture all the relevant information of the two during the 
schema mapping process. There were several limitations with the study, which included the 
consideration of buildings only, and other 3D objects such as roads, bridges, and tunnels were 
not modelled. In addition, the framework, reference ontology, and translator were only 
applicable for IFC and CityGML, and finally, Boundary Representation (BRep), Swept Solid, and 






Four challenges in data integration were identified that Deng et al. (2016) proposed to 
overcome by: 
i. Transformation of geometric representations. IFC supports use of BRep, Swept Solid, 
and CSG, whereas CityGML only supports BRep. The use of a translator paired with the 
Semantic City Model ADE successfully demonstrated the bidirectional conversion of 
common building components such as walls, doors, windows, roof, slabs, and floors, 
(Figure 2-7), whilst retaining the IFC semantic information in the CityGML conversion. 
 
Figure 2-7: Comparison of IFC and CityGML geometric representations where (a) is the BIM model in 
IFC and (b) is the CityGML model generated (from Deng et al., 2016) 
ii. Transformation of local placement system (IFC) to world coordinate system (CityGML). 
Functions were developed for IFC Swept Solid to CityGML BRep and IFC BRep to 
CityGML BRep. The former is the most commonly seen geometric transformation 
based on a function given coordinates “A” and “B” and sweeping vector “V” from the 
sweeping planning and sweeping line, a new IFC BRep surface is generated which can 
be transformed to CityGML BRep directly. The latter extracts the coordinates of IFC 
BRep from the parser and translates to CityGML through the following function: 








] × 𝑀 + ∆                                                 (2) 
where: 
𝐶 represents the CityGML coordinate system 
𝐼 is the IFC local placement system 
𝑀 is the coordinate system transformation matrix 





iii. Harmonisation of LODs (both levels of detail – CityGML, and levels of development - 
IFC) between IFC and CityGML. Currently, there are no complete transformation 
frameworks between LODs in CityGML. The developed translator was able to 
downscale higher LODs to lower versions whilst retaining the semantic information 
associated with the higher LOD, even if components were deleted in the visual output 
(i.e. interior walls). The harmonisation of LODs is fully customisable allowing 
simplification of models to reduce file size. The results of the study demonstrated that 
the translation of high to low LOD was successfully generated with no loss of 
information or incorrect geometry. 
iv. Data loss during the integration process, many entities in IFC, particularly relating to; 
owners, construction processes, cost information, and FM/OM, do not have 
corresponding CityGML entities. Likewise, CityGML contains information relating to 
cartography, which has no IFC equivalent. The developed reference ontology from the 
study by Deng et al. (2016) was able to capture all information from both CityGML and 
IFC, by using Semantic City Model ADE, was also able to store IFC semantic 
information, and translated as a data table in CityGML. Similarly, component 
relationships and structural property information from IFC can also be stored in 
CityGML. 
An example of an Open Web Service for GIS and BIM integration is presented in Lapierre and 
Cote (2007). The process demonstrated that Web Feature Services (WFS) could feasibly 
merge CAD, GIS and BIM formats by creating linkages between source data (Figure 2-8). 
During the development of the process, the current version of IFC did not include the 
elements “IfcGeographicElement” and “IfcGeographicElementType” (as IFC4, BuildingSMART, 
n.d.-a, had not been released), so Lapierre and Cote (2007) undertook a manual process of 
object coordinate to coordinate systems conversion. The progression of IFC4 included further 
steps towards interoperability with GIS. However, it demonstrated one of the biggest 
challenges where isolated ontologies within a domain are being developed, leading to other 





Figure 2-8: Analysis process of building information over a broad geographic area (Lapierre and Cote, 
2007) 
Lapierre and Cote (2007) integrated IFC objects, such as rooms, in the Open Web Service for 
use in temporary medical response facility selection and recognised that this scenario would 
normally involve collaborators from different specialties and organisations, and require the 
most up-to-date information in the shortest possible timeframe. Whilst the integration 
methodology chose a simple room view application of IFC objects (Figure 2-9), it 
demonstrated the applicability to other aspects of a building such as utility-building 
connections (discussed in detail as part of the case study in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
 
Figure 2-9: Textual building room report (left) and visual building assessment (right) (Lapierre and 
Cote, 2007) 
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2.2.4.3. Application level 
Niu et al. (2015) presented a simplistic integration method where they developed a process 
of extracting the useful information out of a BIM model, simplified, and stored as a .gbXML 
file (Green Building XML). The .gbXML file is then converted to Keyhole Markup Language file 
extensions (.kml) and Collaborative Design Activity (COLLADA) and presented in Google Earth 
as shown in Figure 2-10. Whilst not a costly method in terms of time and labour, as presented 
in Table 6, application-based integration methods are designed to solve one problem and 
normally cannot be adopted by others. In the case of Niu et al. (2015), the tool was designed 
to assess building energy consumption.  
 
Figure 2-10: Google earth representation of 3D models showing daily peak cooling load (left), energy 






2.2.5. Applications of Integrated GIS and BIM 
The integration of GIS and BIM is a relatively modern research topic, and despite many 
publications highlighting its potential use as an FM/OM tool (Mignard and Nicolle, 2014; 
Zhang et al., 2009), the commonalities and complementary attributes of the systems also lend 
themselves to becoming a crucial application in the characterisation of urban risk, resilience 
and vulnerability. By having access to up-to-date, accurate quantitative city-wide data, 
showing a fully integrated model of the infrastructure lifelines and the critical sites they 
service, the integrated tool would provide the ability to assess the 4 Rs (Section 1.2.2) and in 
turn demonstrate the progress/success of the Sendai targets set by UNISDR (2015) 
(Section 1.1). The applications of an integrated tool are discussed in detail in the subsequent 
sections. 
Fosu et al. (2015), present their own literature review of future needs, and note that recent 
research has been trying to combine GIS and BIM data for various purposes such as utility 
visualisation, climate adaptation, and natural hazard damage analysis. Whilst extensive 
research has been undertaken within BIM and GIS, independently, the nature of their 
respective datasets is complementary to one another, demonstrating a need for further 
research in their integration (de Laat and Van Berlo, 2011). Kurwi et al. (2017) provided a table 
of applications of an integrated BIM and GIS system, an excerpt of which is presented in 
Table 7. 
Table 7: Applications of GIS and BIM integration (modified from Kurwi et al., 2017) 
Project Stage Application Reference 
Planning and 
design 
Select the site and manage fire response Isikdag et al. (2008) 
Easiest collaboration between planning Niu et al. (2015) 
Construction Managing construction supply chain, green 
design, construction and sustainable 
sequences 




Emphasise the material delivered by enabling 
tracking the status of the supply chain. 
Irizarry et al. (2013) 
Flood damage assessment Amirebrahimi et al. 
(2015) 
Detect and map the information for pipe 
networks 
Liu and Issa (2012) 
Managing the processes of maintenance and 
repair of facility management 




Other applications for integrated GIS and BIM include the following, which are discussed in 
the remainder of this section: 
 Asset management, 
 Heritage Management, 
 Urban Environment Analysis, 
 Performance of the Built Environment to Hazards,  
 Location-based services and navigation in applications such as emergency response. 
The combination of BIM and GIS allows for effective management of heterogeneous 
information from different sources and can provide essential support for decision-making 
(i.e. resilience planning). 
 
2.2.5.1. Vertical and Horizontal Infrastructure Connectivity 
Whilst the previous section presented methods integrating BIM into a GIS platform, there are 
very few examples where horizontal infrastructure and utilities are geospatially referenced 
within a BIM model, and even fewer linking buildings to their associated utilities in a 
GIS platform. The concept of integration itself is not new. Aien et al. (2015) presented a 
3D conceptual data model (3DCDM) integrating legal (e.g. land use zoning, cadastral 
boundaries) and physical objects, which included utility networks. The lack of utility networks 
in a 3D digital built environment are further reinforced in Liu et al. (2017) who recognised 
having utilities network BIM data combined with InfraGML (Section 2.2.4.1) will improve 
GIS management and network analysis. 
Hijazi et al. (2011) acknowledged that 3D models have neglected utility networks in built 
environments. To overcome this, they presented a method to integrate interior building 
utilities (Figure 2-11, highlighted red area) into a city model by means of semantics mapping 





Figure 2-11: IFC schema representing the interior utility hierarchy chart (red area) (Hijazi et al., 2011) 
 
A secondary benefit to the research by Hijazi et al. (2011) is that their model allowed 
integration of multiple utility networks within a city, and enabled one element to be used in 
more than one system e.g. a water heater (electricity network) connected to the hot and cold 
water systems (potable water network), providing a truer reflection of the “real world” 
environment. The resulting semantic mapping integrated IFC and CityGML schema without 
loss of data, and grouped the main concepts of utility networks at an abstract data level 
regardless of type, as shown in Figure 2-12. Figure 2-13 presents the graph structure 
generated in UtilityNetworkADE by transforming IFC entities and creating logical and physical 





Figure 2-12: UtilityNetworkADE and its relation to CityGML (Hijazi et al., 2011) 
 
 
Figure 2-13: Comparison of three port models between IfcFlowFitting and the corresponding model 




Expanding on the work by Hijazi et al. (2011), Liu and Issa (2012) presented a four-step process 
for producing a 3D visualisation of a building interconnected with its street-level utilities, 
through conversion and integration of BIM and GIS data as per the following: 
1. Collect the BIM Revit model (in .adsk format) and GIS dataset for the utilities from the 
corresponding departments. 
2. Clean up the GIS .shp files in ArcMap and ArcCatalog, confirm corresponding attribute 
fields. 
3. Ensure .adsk and .shp files share the same coordinate system and then import into 
Civil3D. 
4. Depending on the type of data, clean up utility information to ensure only one line is 
present to represent one pipe. 
Once the C3D file had been created, manual review was recommended to query the model 
regarding location and elevation of each pipe and structure. Figure 2-14 demonstrates this 
review process and the resulting visualisation of connection between interior and exterior 
pipes. 
 






Whilst Liu and Issa (2012) demonstrates the means to integrate horizontal and vertical 
infrastructure, the method was only applied to one utility type for one building. In order to 
implement this for an entire city, huge amounts of data are required, as well as a method for 
mass integration. Limitations of this process are that it is time-consuming and requires several 
commercially available software packages. In addition, interrogation to ensure accuracy is a 
manual process. However, if local government and asset managers are going to manage the 
data in an integrated tool (basis of the focus of this thesis; see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) with 
respect to their own assets, and how designers submit their consent applications, the 
submitted data could be federated to make integration easier. Alternatively, the 
implementation of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) QA process would identify erroneous data for 
further investigation (discussed further in Section 5.2.1). 
 
2.2.5.2. Asset Management and Facilities Management 
The integration of GIS and BIM for asset management is in early stages of development, 
predominantly due to the inconsistent provision of as-built BIM data (Section 2.2.2). 
However, the applications and benefits from integrating these two technologies are 
significant. The non-graphic information contained in a BIM (e.g. manufacturer, serial 
number, model number) can be migrated into an asset management system. These 
non-graphic data are critical for maintenance management such as preventative maintenance 
works orders. Visualising assets in a 3D geospatial interdependent network 
(Bhamidipati et al., 2016), combined with geometric and non-graphic data, can assist in 
supply chain management for maintenance works orders (calculating costs based on lengths 
and component types for example) and improve on the operation life-cycle of components 
within the BIM data (Irizarry et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2009). Similarly, Zhang et al. (2009) 
identified the capability of GIS and BIM in modelling for uses such as heating and cooling 
utility costs. Other abilities included querying interactions among building assets in risk 
analysis for example, the consequences associated with a break in a pipeline on other 






Mignard and Nicolle (2014) built a semantics-based ADE (Section 2.2.4.2) as an extension to 
ACTIVe3D (Vanlande et al., 2008), for integrating IFC and CityGML data, termed an Urban 
Information Model (UIM). Mignard and Nicolle (2014) also developed an evolutive ontology 
as part of the ADE whereby the use of specific operators, able to log changes in data, can track 
the evolution of the environment, and model the whole lifecycle of the ontology. 
The semantic and geometric data are stored separately through the ontology. The SIGA3D 
viewer combined with the ADE is able to operate bidirectional queries, in that geometric 
queries using the semantic data can produce 3D views, and vice versa (semantic queries using 
the 3D data can obtain the additional information from the 3D objects). Whilst Mignard and 
Nicolle (2014) concluded that the UIM is able to integrate CityGML and IFC data into a 
platform and present them visually in SIGA3D, what is not clear from the research is the 
interconnectedness between the elements. Using Figure 2-15 as an example, it is not clear if 
the representation of trees can be used to assess shadows cast on buildings.  
 
 






Centofanti et al. (2011) presented a simplistic methodology of developing 3D building models 
in software such as AutoCAD and integrating them into a GIS environment. The results 
demonstrated basic interrogation functions of dimension data that can be calculated in the 
Esri ArcSuite of software (ArcScene and ArcGIS). Other basic semantic information was 
mapped to components in an attribute schedule. This functionality was expanded in further 
research by creating retrospective BIM models, generated through laser scanning and 
photogrammetric surveying (Dore and Murphy, 2012). However, the semantic data 
associated with these models had to be manually entered (except for geometry and 
geospatial coordinate reference data, which was obtained through laser scanning). 
Equally, for complex models containing architectural type features such as columns, these 
also had to be manually drawn and mapped to the scanned models. The developed BIM 
models were converted to CityGML in Google SketchUp through use of a plugin. 
While Dore and Murphy (2012) and Centofanti et al. (2011) focussed on building exteriors 
with limited interior information, InteliBuild (2016) used laser scanning and point cloud 
technology to develop as-built models of building interiors. The scans were able to produce 
geometrically accurate 3D models and 2D plans, which could aid asset managers with 
renovation concept design, rent calculation based on floor area, and provide a basic model 
for facility management. Similar to Dore and Murphy (2012) and Centofanti et al. (2011), 
InteliBuild (2016) also contains geometry but lacks the detailed semantic information of a 
traditionally designed BIM model. However, where these technologies are able to add value, 
particularly in the development of digital twins (Section 2.2.5.4), is the ability to carry out 
laser and point cloud scanning during the various stages of construction. This would provide 
the ability to generate as-built BIM models for new builds, an issue identified as part of the 
integration of GIS and BIM (Section 2.2.3). Figure 2-16 presents some of the outputs from 
Dore and Murphy (2012)showing the degree of information contained in the system. 
 




2.2.5.3. Hazard Response (Predictive and Reactive) 
The semantic mapping system proposed by Hijazi et al. (2011) (Section 2.2.5.1) presents a 
means of identifying the various connections between buildings and utilities. In the context 
of risk analysis, Hijazi et al. (2011) noted that urban applications such as emergency response 
are looking for integration of interior and exterior utilities and the means of modelling areas 
of service loss. Similarly, Hijazi et al. (2011) used the example of large-scale facility 
maintenance operations undertaken due to planned (preventive) and “by failure” scenarios, 
each presenting scenarios of service outage for which facility managers would want to plan. 
The integration of interior and exterior utilities would provide the ability to analyse impacts 
on interconnected assets from loss of service, including loss caused by a natural hazard such 
as a seismic event, and such as is presented in this thesis as part of the case study and future 
works (Section 4.2.3 and Section 5.4.1., respectively).  
With respect to hazard management and emergency response, Fosu et al. (2015) noted how 
future research could investigate the means to incorporate intelligent building systems and 
sensors into integrated GIS and BIM tools to simulate real-time response, and to conduct 
emergency drills after a disaster, integrating traffic conditions to calculate optimal paths. 
Equally, sensors could be used to alert the emergency services for those buildings that have 
been severely impacted by a disaster. These types of sensor technology for monitoring 
buildings represents progress in the development of digital twins/digital cities (discussed in 
Section 2.2.5.4) some of which are being implemented in New Zealand (CCC, n.d.; LINZ, 2017; 
New Zealand Government, 2018). Other current technologies such as GIS and GPS allow 
MCDEM operations centres to provide guidance to first responders in navigating to a target 
building following a natural hazard occurrence. However, with the introduction of detailed 
building information and layout including layout of water and electricity supplies, this can 
improve effective decision making during the planning of emergency response, such as 
identifying where fire hydrants are located, or electricity shut-off switches. Similarly, the 
development of IndoorGML as an application for indoor navigation and a data source for 
building interior topology provides an extension to first responder navigation 
(Fosu et al., 2015) by identifying safe routes into a building (Shayeganfar et al., 2008; 




Grasso and Maugeri (2003, 2009) presented an intelligent system for the assessment of 
vulnerability using building, infrastructure, seismic, and geological data in a GIS model of 
Catania, Italy, as a means of undertaking seismic risk analysis. Initially, Grasso and Maugeri 
(2003) demonstrated the means of creating a highly detailed GIS system integrating 
15 databases, which comprised; 5,000 public and private buildings, the city’s road network, 
geological data comprising 910 boreholes, and hazard models such as predicted ground 
motion and liquefaction susceptibility. Following this, Grasso and Maugeri (2009) used the 
GIS system to undertake seismic risk analysis of Catania. Grasso and Maugeri (2009) also 
acknowledged that seismic risk of a city is not simply an aggregate of the risk to each building, 
but that the whole urban system, such as road infrastructure, lifelines, and urban framework 
play an important role in the vulnerability of a city (reinforcing the sentiments and research 
by Bhamidipati et al. (2016) in Section 2.2.1). The highly detailed analytical procedure by 
Grasso and Maugeri (2009) incorporated a range of analyses for various aspects of a city 
including; bearing capacity analysis of foundations (using Eurocode EC8 and the nearest 
available geotechnical data from the 910 boreholes) and response and definition of flexural 
and torsional modal shapes of ancient buildings (using available building models as shown in 
Figure 2-17). Lifeline and urban system vulnerability assessment was also undertaken by 
Grasso and Maugeri (2009), with the lifeline vulnerability focussing on lateral ground 
movement response caused by slope instability, rather than liquefaction-induced settlement 
and lateral spreading. However, the discrete element method used to assess lifelines did 
allow for evaluation of stresses and deformation along the networks. In addition, the 
calculation of displacement, lateral deflection, and bending moment of the networks was not 





Both Bhamidipati et al. (2016) and Grasso and Maugeri (2009) concluded that an 
“intelligent Data Bank” of various land and building attribute data can be used as a means of 
large-scale vulnerability evaluation. Bhamidipati et al. (2016) and Grasso and Maugeri (2009) 
also proposed that local risk analysis of individual buildings could be connected into a more 
global analysis of a city by means of a GIS system. This thesis aims to demonstrate the citywide 
analysis proposed by Grasso and Maugeri (2003, 2009) through integration of GIS and BIM 
datasets into a 3D GIS-based semantic tool. The tool will include data that provides semantic 
information for private laterals (such as those included in IfcFlowFitting as discussed by Hijazi 
et al., 2011, in Section 2.2.5.1) as an information source for assessing consequential damage 
within an interconnected network (building on the research by Bhamidipati et al., 2016).  
Whilst the proposed workflow in this thesis does not assess site-specific geotechnical data in 
the same way that Grasso and Maugeri (2003, 2009) did, the serviceability loss model 
(Bellagamba et al., 2018b, in Section 3.2) used as the computational engine in this thesis, does 









Several studies have attempted to model seismically induced building damage on multiple 
buildings in a single simulation (Barbat et al., 2010; Xiong et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2014). 
Xu et al. (2014) used a predominantly 3D GIS-based analysis (without BIM data) combined 
with nonlinear Time History Analysis (THA) and multi-storey concentrated-mass shear (MCS) 
modelling, to produce a simplified block building model which assessed performance using 
the HAZUS five states of damage (Figure 2-18a). Conversely, Barbat et al. (2010) and 
Xiong et al. (2015) used a combination of known building attribute data and high-fidelity 
building models generated in 3D-GIS (Figure 2-18b). Xiong et al. (2015) acknowledged that at 
the time of the study, there was a lack of 3D-GIS data due to confidentiality issues, and where 
data were available, the formats were either 3D polygonal or solid models, both lacking 
detailed geometry such as floor plan layout (something that would readily be available in an 
as-built BIM model).  
 
Figure 2-18: Seismic analysis of an urban area where (a) shows the HAZUS five damage state analysis 






Along with Barbat et al. (2010) and Xiong et al. (2015), Franchin and Cavalieri (2013) 
considered social aspects in their respective seismic hazard analyses whereby a series of 
fragility functions were derived using factors such as number of injured people, population 
density, emergency response availability, and damage to lifelines. 
Both Franchin and Cavalieri (2013) and Barbat et al. (2010) utilised probabilistic and 
deterministic scenarios, implementing a Monte Carlo-based simulation. The simplified study 
area from Franchin and Cavalieri (2013) showing the integrated systems, along with graphical 
representations of results, are presented in Figure 2-19 (a and b). 
 
Figure 2-19: Vulnerability analysis of interconnected civil infrastructure where (a) sectional 
representation of connected infrastructure and (b) results of analysis where EPN= “electric power 






Outside of seismic analysis, Isikdag et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2014) presented integrated 
models for fire-fighting simulations and response management operations. Modelling of 
surface and subsurface features such as buildings and geology in an integrated framework for 
planning, design and risk management was conducted by Tegtmeier et al. (2014). The UBM 
by El-Mekawy et al. (2012b) was used in a hospital-based evacuation simulation. 
Through conversion of IFC and CityGML data, and vice versa (Data level process as per 
Section2.2.4.1), a fully georeferenced model of the hospital (including internal room layout) 
was implemented in ArcGIS. Routes were calculated incorporating functions that identified 
doors and windows as exits (one scenario also incorporated the flat roof on the adjacent 
building in its route calculation), to identify all possible paths that allowed all persons within 
the hospital to be evacuated within two minutes. The method by El-Mekawy et al. (2012b) 
has direct applicability, and can be incorporated into the workflow proposed in this thesis by 
allowing emergency response organisations like CDEM to model city-wide evacuation models 
for various natural hazard events including earthquake, tsunami, and flood events. 
Flood events have been modelled in a process-level integrated model (Table 6) by 
Amirebrahimi et al. (2015). Flood analysis was conducted for a case study site in an external 
computational engine and the results exported as an Esri .shp file. IFC geometry data was 
extracted and converted to CityGML for visual representation of the building. The semantic 
data were mapped, post-conversion, through unique identifiers and stored in a database 
(Figure 2-20). 
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By combining the flood map .shp with the 3D building model, Amirebrahimi et al. (2015) 
conducted analysis to identify all walls, doors and floors that were damaged by flooding 
(Figure 2-21) and from this, estimated repair costs were calculated based on the quantities 
calculated from the model. Whilst the integration method followed several other examples 
presented in this thesis (Deng et al., 2016; Hagedorn and Döllner, 2007; Lapierre and Cote, 
2007), it is the aspect of estimating repair costs, which would be most applicable to the 
workflow in this thesis. The method could be used for other hazard analyses including seismic, 
and would be of use for private insurers in their estimation of exposure. Using the geospatial 
workflow in this thesis, if building attribute data were available for an entire city, then a 
forecast of citywide financial loss cost could be estimated for a modelled seismic event 
(such as an AF8 scenario). Similarly, cost estimation has direct applicability to asset and 
facilities management (Section 2.2.5.2). The scenario could be adapted to factor estimated 
lifespan of all building elements and so through query analysis, an asset manager could 
estimate annual maintenance costs of all assets. 
 
Figure 2-21: Outputs of flood analysis where (a) are the flood parameters around the house, (b) is the 
3D visualisation of inundation level for house and (c) shows the damage caused by inundation to the 
walls, doors, and floors, respectively. Green indicates no damage to the component and red indicates 







2.2.5.4. Digital City Development 
The terms “Digital City” and “Smart City” are used interchangeably, and neither is clearly 
defined in the literature as they can have multiple meanings depending on their context. 
For example, Cocchia (2014) conducted a literature review of the terminologies associated 
with the two and identified 11 alternative definitions of “Smart City”, whereby these were 
grouped into three themes: technology dimension, human dimension, and institutional 
dimension (Nam and Pardo, 2011).  
Ma and Ren (2017) provide the most comprehensive definition of “Smart City”: 
“Smart City is a vision to integrate multiple Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
and Internet of Things (IoT) solutions in a secure fashion to manage a city’s assets. In order to 
know what are included, what is happening in the city and how to improve the life quality of 
citizens, Smart City applications need mass data that are both static and dynamic, current and 
historical, geometrical and semantic, microscopic and macroscopic. Once collected, 
management and application of these data often use technologies such as Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS).” 
A comparison of the above definition against an excerpt of the table from Cocchia (2014) is 
presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Published synonyms and definitions for Smart City (modified from Cocchia, 2014) 
Concept Definition Reference 
Virtual City 
“Virtual City concentrates on digital representations and 
manifestations of cities” 
Schuler (2002) 
Information City 
Digital environments collecting official and unofficial 
information from local communities and delivering it to the 





“The Digital City is as a comprehensive, web-based 
representation, or reproduction, of several aspects or 
functions of a specific real city open to non-experts. The 
Digital City has several dimensions: social, cultural, political, 
ideological, and also theoretical” 
Couclelis (2004) 
Knowledge City 
“A Knowledge City is a city that aims at a knowledge-based 
development, by encouraging the continuous creation, 
sharing, evaluation, renewal, and update of knowledge. This 
can be achieved through the continuous interaction between 
its citizens themselves and at the same time between them 
and other cities’ citizens. The citizens’ knowledge-sharing 
culture as well as the city’s appropriate design, IT networks 
and infrastructures support these interactions” 





The definitions in Table 8 best describe the context for this thesis, with a focus on developing 
a process for collecting information from local communities and delivering via web portals a 
reproduction of several aspects of a city. From this, information contained within a Digital City 
can be used for continued creation, sharing, evaluation, renewal, and update of knowledge. 
Previous models of cities under the “Digital City” umbrella include Virtual Helsinki, (Linturi et 
al., 2000; Linturi and Simula, 2003) and Digital City Shanghai (Ding et al., 2003), whose 
purpose were to focus on platforms for social interaction and online communication through 
live video. The Digital City Kyoto project (Ishida et al., 1999) and e-Trikala (Anthopoulos and 
Tsoukalas, 2006) were conceived as research and knowledge sharing projects. Digital City 
Kyoto comprised 2D maps and 3D virtual spaces populated with webpages and real-time 
sensory data; e-Trikala was a multi-tiered architectural model providing support to citizens, 
offering digital public services and improvement to everyday life, whilst also acting as an 
e-government tool. Other cases are presented in Cocchia (2014) who provided a 
comprehensive list of geographies that have implemented Smart and Digital City strategies 
and projects based on 162 case studies as shown in Figure 2-22. 
 
















The examples within Oceania from Figure 2-22 were all based on locations within Australia. 
Within New Zealand, more recent representations of digital cities included the Smart Cities 
Programme (LINZ, 2016, 2017) which developed and tested 13 projects across Auckland, 
Wellington, and Christchurch. The Smart Wellington program aims are, amongst other things, 
to develop a platform for the increased understanding of social systems, creation of better 
environments and to analyse means of recovering from a 7.8 Mw earthquake (New Zealand 
Government, 2018). In Christchurch, the Smart Cities Programme has a focus on sensor 
technology and obtaining real-time data, including an earthquake sensor network to provide 
valuable data for industry and academic research and to aid in improving seismic resilience 
and reducing risk (CCC, n.d.). An evaluation of the LINZ Smart Cities Programme can be found 
in Scally-Irvine and Louisson (2016). 
Couclelis (2004) noted that major problems in Digital City development involve technical 
issues of data modelling and accuracy, arising from merging widely disparate data sources 
into a single integrated product, and privacy issues raised by comprehensive, high-resolution 
geographical databases. Maintenance was also an issue highlighted by Shiffer (1999) in 
keeping the platform current following its initial development, considering the task to be 
tedious, time-consuming, and costly, and underestimated at the outset. This thesis discusses 
methods for overcoming these issues in Chapter 5. 
The common underlying outcome from the literature review is that the majority of digital 
cities developed to date are predominantly for the public domain comprising geographic 
search engines for marketing, retail, and commerce. Few examples were identified where the 
focus was on research, urban planning, or asset management, except for some of those 
currently in development within New Zealand. Ishida (1999) and Börner (2002) recognised 
the importance of digital cities for amongst other things, disaster protection and urban 
planning, but within this literature review, a study or proposal to develop a fully integrated 
Digital City for such a purpose has not been found. Equally, an observation by 
Nam and Pardo (2011) identified a noticeable discrepancy between theories and “visions” of, 






An important point raised by Chourabi et al. (2012) is the role of governance within Smart 
City initiatives and that a critical success factor in delivery of a Smart City was stakeholder 
relationships. Examples of e-government key projects studied by Scholl et al. (2009), found 
that ability to cooperate, support of leadership, structure of alliances, and working under 
different jurisdictions were the main issues impacting success. The implementation of smart 
governance infrastructure (Johnston and Hansen, 2011) is an important process in the 
development of a Smart City which includes citizen participation and private/public 
partnerships that should be accountable, responsive and transparent (Mooij, 2003). 
With what is proposed in this study, the proposed model and workflow closely resembles the 
definition of Digital City by Wildfire (2018) who describes a Digital City as a combination of a 
“reactive” and a “predictive” model. Whilst the article by Wildfire (2018) presents definitions 
and terminologies for a “digital twin,” a term usually used to describe individual processes, 
products, or service, a Digital City could be described as a collection of interdependent 
“digital twins.” The underlying principle of the “Smart City: concept framework” by 
Wildfire (2018) (Figure 2-24) is that “the key drive in a city is to improve people’s lives”, and 
it is this philosophy that needs to be at the forefront of any Digital City development. 
The framework in Figure 2-24 illustrates service layers building from the data collection layer, 
the foundation of a well-organised platform of analytical tools, tailored to specific city issues 


































































































The real power from a predictive model comes from, as the name suggests, predicting 
performance of the built and natural environment. This is best demonstrated from an 
integrated infrastructure perspective by the modelling by Bhamidipati et al. (2016) who 
developed interdependent relationship performance between several horizontal 
infrastructure assets (Section 2.2.1).  
Predictive modelling can be further subcategorised into iterative/feedback loop and response 
models, and sandbox scenario testing. These method categories are designed as a method of 
resilience management, by using “real world” data in hypothetical scenarios, based on 
historic evidence. As has been discussed throughout this chapter, there are numerous 
examples of GIS use for this type of modelling and few for BIM, but it is the research by 
Grasso and Maugeri (2003); Xiong et al. (2015) and Xu et al. (2014) in their methods of 
assessing performance of multiple buildings for seismic hazards that are best placed for use 
in resilience assessment, and particularly applicable to this thesis. Whilst these methods 
generate 3D geometric shapes of buildings using just GIS data, the opportunity for 
improvement of this analysis by using BIM data is apparent. However, to demonstrate the 
true analytical properties of an integrated BIM and GIS system, the flood damage visualisation 
by Amirebrahimi et al. (2015) (Section 2.2.5.3), not only incorporates geospatial and building 
information data, but also factored financial data to determine the cost of repairs. A tool such 
as this would provide significant benefit for the likes of private insurers in the calculation of 
premiums. In addition, asset and facilities managers could also utilise financial data in an 
integrated system for capital works planning. All of these methods, with some modification, 
also have the ability to be used in Sandbox scenario testing where any of the information from 
any of the datasets can be modified to undertake sensitivity analysis on performance during 
hypothetical events. However, if the ETL type process were to be adopted to integrate the 
data and act as a “stream”, strict editing rights would need to be enforced to ensure the 
source data isn’t overwritten. The author of this thesis recommends that all analysis be 
undertaken in external computational engines, but that city authorities mandating federated 
data (assuming the governance issues raised by Chourabi et al., 2012 are resolved) provide 





The second type of model this thesis discusses is classified by Wildfire (2018) as a “reactive” 
model. This type of model provides feedback and visualisations that enhance real-time or 
near real-time interventions to improve the smooth day-to-day running of the city or asset. 
These concepts relate directly to an asset management FM/OM functionality, or potentially 
for use in a disaster scenario as an emergency response tool (Franchin and Cavalieri, 2013). 
This type of model could be accomplished by incorporating the methodologies proposed by 
Al-Kasisbeh and Abudayyeh (2018) and Schultz (2012) who were able to develop AM-type 
tools in GIS adopting both risk and resilience frameworks in their analysis. The benefit to a 
GIS/BIM integrated tool for a reactive model comes with the cost information in IFC 
semantics. If this information were incorporated into the model as Amirebrahimi et al. (2015) 
did with the flood analysis, then the functionality moves even closer towards a fully integrated 
FM/OM tool. The final piece to the puzzle with a fully integrated digital twin for FM/OM would 
come with the introduction of sensors and other smart technologies in the physical assets as 
described by Yalcinkaya and Singh (2014) (Section 2.2.2). 
However, as Wildfire (2018) discussed, many of these concepts are currently more 
“blue sky thinking” as there are very few cities that are either developing city-scale models, 
or have the means to develop one due to their economy. A sense of realism should be applied 
and any planned developments should be scaled and designed with the city in mind. 
The biggest disconnect from truly realising a digital twin is the transfer of data during the 
project life-cycle, as highlighted throughout Chapter 2. Until the workflow of design to client 
handover of an as-built georeferenced BIM model is achieved, through collaboration with the 
entire infrastructure community, the goal of a Digital City delivering significant and tangible 






This section presented common data formats in the digital engineering field, their 
applications (independently and collectively) in disaster risk and resilience management, and 
asset management/FM/OM, the means to integrate smart technologies, and the current 
knowledge gaps in the development of a fully federated Digital City. The methods addressed 
some of the fundamental principles of digital integration in their own fields, but no published 
article contained the one-stop-shop solution. 
The remainder of this thesis takes the key findings of integration technologies, and working 
alongside NextSpace Ltd., aims to develop a hybrid integration solution. The technologies and 
methods from this Chapter that are used in the development of the geospatial workflow and 
implemented in the case study are: 
 Semi-automatic translation ETL process for “streaming” and visualising data 
(Section 2.2.4.1). 
 The use of WFS for “streaming” data and integrating IFC and CityGML data 
(Section  2.2.4.2) 
 The use of an open web service for visualisation of the geospatial platform 
(Section 2.2.4.2). 
One of the main objectives of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate a method that effectively negates 
data loss through the integration process, a limitation of many of the methods presented in 
Table 6. Secondly, this research proposes to implement a workflow for use in the assessment 
of urban risk and resilience, focussing on seismic hazards. The case study leverages off an 
existing computational engine (Section 3.2) and the geospatial workflow aims to expand on 
the points in Section 2.2.5.4 i.e. demonstrating an analysis workflow without having direct 
editing access to source data. 
Finally, time and cost appear to be another significant area of concern with the development 
of a Digital City. Therefore, this research will discuss where time efficiencies can be made, 
particularly through collaboration with local and national government where nationally 




2.3. Christchurch Case Study Area 
2.3.1. Regional Tectonics 
New Zealand lies along the boundary of the Australian and Pacific Plates. In the North Island, 
active tectonics are dominated by an oblique subduction along the Hikurangi trough, whilst 
in the South Island much of the relative displacement between these plates is taken up by the 
Alpine fault, an 850 km dextral-reverse transpressional fault within the axial tectonic belt 
known as the Southern Alps (Figure 2-24). The Alpine Fault is considered highly active with an 
average slip rate of 39 mm/year and the ability to produce Mw 7-8 earthquakes with a return 
period of 271 ± 73 years (Baratin et al., 2018). 
 
Figure 2-24: Tectonic setting of New Zealand (Ring and Hampton, 2012). Inset: motion of Pacific plate 
for a point at Lyttelton in an Australia plate fixed reference frame. The graph shows the azimuth 
changed from ~240° at 15 Ma to ~246° at 8 Ma and relative plate motion increased by ~10 mm a−1. 
Pre-CES GPS measurements indicated regional strain rates of ~2 mm/yr-1 shortening with a 
(σ1) azimuth of 110-120o over an approximate 150 km wide region, known as the Canterbury 
Block. These rates are generally lower when compared to more tectonically active areas of 
the diffuse plate boundary zone, but higher than active “intraplate” settings in regions further 




2.3.2. Geology of the Christchurch Area 
Christchurch is located on the east coast of New Zealand’s South Island within the Canterbury 
plains. The geology of the Christchurch area has been described by Brown and Weeber (1992) 
as a complex of alluvial sand, silt and gravel fan deposits, stemming from the eastward flowing 
Rakaia and Waimakariri rivers emerging from the foothills of the Southern Alps.  
Whilst bedrock is often found at depths of between 300-800 m, the surface geology of 
Christchurch is predominantly Holocene alluvial gravel, sand, silt, and clay and peat deposits, 
split into two main regions; Central Christchurch and eastern Christchurch. 
Springston  Formation deposits, a combination of overbank flood deposits of sand and silt, 
and river flood channels containing alluvial gravel, dominate the majority of Central 
Christchurch. The fine sediments form aquicludes and aquitards between the gravel aquifers. 
Due to the low-lying riverine and coastal environment, the water Table is generally less than 
three metres deep across the urban area. 
In eastern Christchurch, where the water table is generally less than 1.0 m from the surface, 
the postglacial Christchurch Formation is prevalent comprising mainly sand (some deposits 
including shells), silt, clay and peat formed in estuarine, lagoonal, dune, and coastal swamp 
environments. 
The Port Hills, located along the southeast edge of Christchurch form part of the 
Banks Peninsula, a now-extinct volcano of Tertiary basalt composition, overlain by windblown 
loess deposits. Figure 2-25 presents an excerpt from the geological map in 













2.3.3. 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
2.3.3.1. Overview – Seismology of the CES 
During 2010 and 2011, Canterbury was subjected to six large earthquakes and thousands of 
aftershocks with moment magnitudes (Mw) as high as 6.2, which affected Christchurch, the 
second largest city in New Zealand, and surrounding communities. The causative faults of 
these earthquakes were either close to or within the city boundaries resulting in strong 
ground motions and causing widespread damage throughout the city. These earthquakes are 
termed the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (GNS Science, 2011), hereinafter referred to as 
the CES.  
The works by Bradley and Hughes (2012a, 2012b) and Bradley et al. (2014) characterise 
ground motion data (PGA and PGV) for the four main earthquake events (4th September 2010, 
22nd February 2011, 13th June 2011, and 23rd December 2011), using recorded values at strong 
motion stations, as well as an empirical ground motion model to predict PGA values at 
locations away from those stations.  
The initial shock, the largest in the sequence, struck at 04:36 on Saturday 4th September 2010. 
With its epicentre located near the town of Darfield, approximately 30 km west of 
Christchurch, a 7.1 Mw earthquake ruptured at a depth of approximately 10 km, along a 
previously unknown, east-west trending, strike-slip fault, now named the Greendale fault 
(hereafter referred to as the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake). Local media reported 
the rolling motion lasting approximately 30-40 seconds and resulted in Central Christchurch 
experiencing moderate levels of ground shaking, liquefaction, and damage to lifelines. 
Widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred in areas close to waterways within 
Christchurch and particularly the eastern suburbs, and the nearby towns of Kaiapoi and 
Taitapu (Cubrinovski and Green, 2010). Recorded ground motions close to the epicentre 
registered peak ground accelerations (PGAs) in the order of magnitude of 0.5-0.9 g. 
However, in these areas population density is generally low comprising predominantly rural 
farming infrastructure. Closer to the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD), ground 
motions were much lower with PGAs of 0.18 to 0.25 g, and a few cases with recordings of 




On 22nd February 2011 at 12:51, a much more devastating 6.3 Mw earthquake struck along a 
blind oblique-thrust rupture of a generally north-east to south-west trending fault at the base 
of the Port Hills, 10 km south-east of Christchurch City (hereafter referred as the 22nd February 
2011 Christchurch Earthquake). The increased devastation was due to the epicentre’s location 
being much closer to the CBD and at a shallower depth (5-6 km). The severe shaking only 
lasted approximately 15 seconds but caused widespread damage to vertical and horizontal 
infrastructure and resulted in 185 fatalities. Compared to the 4th September 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake, the recorded PGAs were expectedly much higher for the 22nd February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake, which on average was approximately 0.5 g in both the horizontal 
and vertical direction within the Christchurch CBD (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). However, closer 
to the epicentre, the highest PGA was recorded at the Heathcote Valley Primary School, 
measuring 1.7 g in the horizontal and 2.2 g in the vertical directions. These higher PGAs also 
led to the widespread occurrence of severe liquefaction and attendant manifestation of 
ejected sands and silts, and lateral spreading, relative to that experienced during the 
4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake. This liquefaction-induced permanent ground 
deformation caused much of the damage to structures and infrastructure lifelines across 
Christchurch. Figure 2-26 illustrates the PGA ground motions for the 4th September 
2010 Darfield Earthquake and 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake where the data 
are shown with respect to the spatial distribution of PGA over the region. The largest PGV was 
recorded at the Greendale strong motion station (GDLC) and measured 115cm/s-1 during the 
4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake. Similar to the PGA maps produced in Figure 2-26, 
Bradley and Hughes (2012a, 2012b) and Bradley et al. (2014) produced similar illustrations 









Figure 2-26: Interpolated PGA values from strong motion station measurements for the 4th September 
2010 Darfield Earthquake (top) and 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (bottom) (modified 
from Bradley and Hughes, 2012a; Bradley and Hughes, 2012b; Bradley et al., 2014). Red box outlines 








Figure 2-27: Interpolated PGV values for the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake (top) and 22nd 
February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (bottom) (modified from Bradley and Hughes, 2012a; Bradley 





Following from the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, the subsequent major 
earthquakes occurred on 13 June 2011 with a magnitude 5.3 Mw rupturing at 13:00 and a 
second event at 14:20 with a magnitude of 6.0 Mw. The former event ruptured along a 
north-west to southeast trending fault within the Port Hills, the latter in a similar orientation 
to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Cubrinovski et al., 2014). Due to the short 
time difference between the occurrences of these two earthquakes, they are generally 
reported and treated as a single event in the literature (and herein referred to as the 13th June 
2011 Christchurch Earthquake). The 13th June 2011 Christchurch Earthquake caused further 
damage to previously damaged structures and additional ejected sand and silt caused by in 
some cases, as equally severe liquefaction as that experienced during the Christchurch 
earthquake. Maximum recorded PGAs for this event were in the order of 0.50 g in the Port 
Hills area, 0.35 g+ in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch, and approximately 0.20 g in the CBD 
(Eidinger and Tang, 2012). 
The final major event towards the end of 2011 was also a double event similar to what 
occurred in the 13th June 2011 Christchurch Earthquake comprising a foreshock of magnitude 
5.8 Mw occurring at 12:58 followed by the main shock of 5.9 Mw occurring 20 minutes later 
on 23 December 2011 (referred to as the 23rd December 2011 Christchurch Earthquake) 
(Bradley and Hughes, 2012b). For the foreshock, PGAs in the eastern suburbs were in the 
order of 0.35 to 0.98 g, whilst those in the CBD were much smaller measuring 0.15 to 0.20 g. 
The main shock recorded PGAs of similar magnitude to that of the foreshock being 
approximately 0.34 to 0.66 g and 0.15 to 0.25 g for the eastern suburbs and CBD, respectively 
(Eidinger and Tang, 2012). Whilst liquefaction was observed during this event to a much lesser 
extent than those previously, additional damage was caused by the collapse of previously 
damaged buildings in the CBD. Cubrinovski et al. (2014) presented a graphical representation 
of each of the major fault planes with regional surficial geology and seismicity also shown, in 







Figure 2-28: Causative fault planes of the CES (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) where star symbols represent 





2.3.3.2. Liquefaction and Ground Motion 
Much of the damage to the city was caused by liquefaction that mainly occurred in saturated, 
unconsolidated alluvial and marine fine sediments in eastern Christchurch, in the region of 
late Holocene coastal progradation (Hughes et al., 2015). Significant reconnaissance was 
undertaken by several parties and collated as part of a national database to document the 
location and severity of land damage across the major earthquake events (NZGD, 2016). 
The use of geospatial data including Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR), 
Global Positioning System (GPS), and Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) have greatly 
improved the resolution of imagery that earthquakes and their environmental effects can be 
recorded (Quigley et al., 2016). For example, LiDAR surveys carried out pre-CES in 2003 and 
post- earthquake surveys, approximately one month following each subsequent event 
throughout the CES, provided the means to quantify property subsidence for insurance 
assessments and reconstruction work.  
From these data, Hughes et al. (2015), developed between-event maps showing total vertical 
elevation changes, elevation changes due to liquefaction, lateral ground movements due to 
liquefaction and vertical tectonic changes. The results showed that the 4th September 2010 
Darfield Earthquake caused 74% of central and eastern Christchurch to subside, 60% of which 
did so by 0.2 m. Comparing this to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake where 
83% of the same area subsided further, where 78% of this dropped an additional 0.3 m and 
localised areas exhibited settlement exceeding 1.0 m. The 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake was also categorised by almost 0.5 m of tectonic uplift of blind faults in the 
Avon-Heathcote Estuary.  
These changes were the result of lateral spreading, topographic re-levelling, volume loss due 
to water, sand and silt ejecta to the ground surface and post-liquefaction volumetric 
densification (Cubrinovski et al., 2015). This in turn has exacerbated longstanding flooding 
issues and vulnerability to tsunami and sea-level rise impacts (Hughes et al., 2015). 
Figure 2-29(a and b) below collate some of the key findings from the field observations for 
the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake and 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
as documented in NZGD (2016). As would be expected, the assessments carried out following 
the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, were incomplete prior to the occurrence of the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. By this point, a significantly larger workforce 







Figure 2-29: Exert of field observations and reconnaissance work where (top) represents data collected 
following the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, and (bottom) is from the 22nd February 2011 




2.3.3.3. Impacts on Horizontal Infrastructure 
Across the horizontal infrastructure networks, areas where liquefaction caused large ground 
deformations in the form of differential settlement and lateral spreading, resulted in vertical 
angular distortions and horizontal strains in the soil column, in which horizontal infrastructure 
networks are embedded (Bouziou and O’Rourke, 2017; Eidinger and Tang, 2012; O'Rourke et 
al., 2014). These deformations often exceeded the design capacity of infrastructure 
components, resulting in faults which in turn induced major power outages and loss of 
functionality in the electricity network (Giovinazzi and Wilson, 2012; Giovinazzi et al., 2011; 
Kwasinski et al., 2014). Similarly, the water network capacities were insufficient to resist the 
movements and loads experienced, leading to widespread damage and failure/breaks. 
Information relating to event-specific damage in the potable water network is much more 
readily available than the wastewater, predominantly due to the shallow embedment depth 
of the former, leading to faults being clear between events (Cubrinovski et al., 2014; O'Rourke 
et al., 2014).  
Most of the damage and impacts to lifelines from the CES was due to liquefaction-induced 
settlement and lateral spreading (Cubrinovski et al., 2014; Giovinazzi et al., 2011). Strong 
ground shaking played a modest role in the performance of lifeline-related buildings 
(e.g. substations, water treatment plants). Substantial damage occurred to potable water, 
wastewater and power distribution systems, moderate damage to telecommunications, 
railway, and the road/highway bridge networks, and light damage occurred to power 
transmission systems and gas distribution and liquid fuels (Eidinger and Tang, 2012). 
The damage caused to lifelines and infrastructure covered approximately one third of the city 
area. For further details on the taxonomy of the horizontal infrastructure, refer to 
Appendix A.1 and a more comprehensive review of horizontal infrastructure performance can 





2.3.3.3.1. 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
The greatest impact on horizontal infrastructure was on the potable water and wastewater 
systems, where there was a loss of service, and discharge of wastewater. As would be 
expected for a reactive process to an earthquake event, and as documented in 
Cubrinovski et al. (2014), the availability and systematic recording of pipe damage and 
associated repairs were sparse.  
However, the reconnaissance work by Cubrinovski and Green (2010) assessed some water 
network performance following the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, namely that the 
predominant damage mechanism to CCC’s water and wastewater systems was ground 
movement and floating of manholes. Where breaks and joint separation occurred in the 
wastewater network, a significant influx of ejected sand was discovered, which hampered 
restoration of the service. CCC estimated that the volume of ejecta removed from pipes and 
pump stations was in the order of 9,000 m3.  
A secondary effect of broken pipes saw a 20% increase in flow rate into wastewater treatment 
plants due to an influx of groundwater into the pipe network. At the same time, Eidinger and 
Tang (2012) noted rapid depressurisation of major portions of the potable water network due 
to the large number of broken pipes in liquefaction zones (Figure 2-30) and power outages 
disrupting water supply from wells. 
 




Figure 2-31 taken from Eidinger and Tang (2012) shows the extensive repairs undertaken in 
north-east Christchurch. Horseshoe Lake in Burwood was a suburb to have suffered some of 
the greatest liquefaction-induced pipe damage and CCC replaced many of the pipes in this 
area with high-density polyethylene (HDPE), prior to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake. 
Newer facilities with flexible joints performed better than older rigid connections and all 
back-up power supplies at each of the pump stations worked as intended. Of note is the 
observation that asbestos cement (AC) pipes sustained significant damage when subjected to 
greater than 50 mm of settlement or 300 mm of lateral spreading. Typical repairs to the 
network included using external clamps or partial replacement with PVC pipe, cut into the 
damaged sections. By mid-October 2010, about 280 repairs to potable water and wastewater 
pipes had been carried out, at a cost of roughly NZ$12m.  
Contrary to this, the electric power systems performed relatively well with performance 
attributed to improvements made in response to vulnerabilities highlighted in Christchurch 
Engineering Lifelines Group (1997). Other lifelines such a telecommunications and fuel also 
performed well. Due to the distance of the epicentre from Christchurch City, the 
4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake caused relatively minor damage overall to the 
network. Within the available literature, Watson (2010), Eidinger and Tang (2012), and 
Kwasinski et al. (2014) provide the best sources of information for recorded damage following 
the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake. Eidinger and Tang (2012) estimated 
infrastructure damage in the range of NZ$1bn with Central Christchurch experiencing 






Figure 2-31: Map of water pipe repairs following the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake (Eidinger 





2.3.3.3.2. 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Unlike the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, where the literature generally shows the 
electricity network to have performed better than the water network, following the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, both networks sustained significant damage. 
Eidinger and Tang (2012) estimated building and infrastructure damage was in the range of 
NZ$15bn- NZ$25bn, of which at least NZ$50m could be attributed to the electricity network 
(Giovinazzi et al., 2011). Despite the total repair cost to the water network not being available, 
it is known that approximately NZ$125m was spent on CCTV assessments to determine extent 
of pipe damage (Cubrinovski et al., 2014). 
Following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, the albeit short-term lessons 
learnt from the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake were quickly applied in the recording 
and assessment of damage. Across the water network, 3,000 pipe repairs were completed by 
approximately 300 pipe repair crews taking six weeks to complete the works 
(Eidinger and Tang, 2012). CCC and SCIRT mobilised to digitally record faults and repairs to 
the water network, for the 36,000 potable water and wastewater service requests, lodged in  
the five months following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
(Giovinazzi et al., 2011).The full records of damage and repairs are presented in 
Bouziou and O’Rourke (2017) and Eidinger and Tang (2012), the former of which is presented 
in Figure 2-32. 
 
Figure 2-32: Water distribution system during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 




With respect to the potable water network, Cubrinovski et al. (2011) noted approximately 
78 km of potable pipe length were damaged with 80% of these in areas of observed 
liquefaction. Eidinger and Tang (2012) indicated 20 out of 160 wells were reported as 
damaged including collapsed casing pipes, and damage caused by liquefaction-induced 
settlement and lateral spreading. However, Giovinazzi et al. (2011) reported that by 
August 2011, construction of 12 km of pressure mains, repair of 60 supply wells, and renewal 
of 150 km and 100 km of potable water mains and submains, respectively had been 
undertaken. Of interest is the observation by Eidinger and Tang (2012) where the HDPE 
potable water pipes installed in Horseshoe Lake following the 4th September 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake, suffered no leaks from the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake.  
Giovinazzi et al. (2011) reported that it took approximately one month for 95% of the city to 
regain its potable water supply, whilst Eidinger and Tang (2012) estimated the restoration of 
the wastewater network in eastern Christchurch alone took up to one year. Throughout the 
literature, poor performance of the network was attributed to damage from cracking and 
joint and laterals failures. This included wastewater pipes stretching at bridge crossings 
caused by lateral spreading, breaks at connection pipelines due to the combination of 
concrete vault buoyancy and liquefaction-induced settlement, and loss of critical services like 
pump stations and wastewater treatment plants. Similarly, like the entry of sand and silt into 
the network following the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, inspection, and repair of 






2.3.3.4. Impacts on Vertical Infrastructure 
Christchurch City, prior to the CES, comprised some 185,000 buildings, 155,000 of which were 
residential dwellings generally of lightweight construction. In the commercial/industrial 
sectors of the city, approximately 4800 brick and masonry buildings, at least 600 of which 
were recorded as unreinforced masonry (URM) structures. During the CES, some of these 
URMs suffered complete or partial collapse and the majority suffered moderate to extensive 
damage (Cubrinovski and Green, 2010; Kam et al., 2011). Generally, reinforced concrete (RC) 
and steel structures performed better than masonry and brick buildings, with only a small 
number of them considered unsafe for occupancy. Liquefaction and lateral spreading as well 
as shaking caused damage to approximately 20,000 residential structures, none of which 
collapsed or are known to have caused fatalities (Cubrinovski et al., 2011; Orense et al., 2011). 
However, around 7,000 of these were abandoned due to serious damage, predominantly in 
the eastern suburbs of Christchurch, labelled the “Residential Red Zone.” Further information 
on the taxonomy of the vertical infrastructure is summarised in Appendix A.2 and a more 





2.3.3.4.1. 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3.3.1, the distance of the epicentre from Christchurch City played 
a significant factor in the extent of damage. Whilst it is well documented that suburbs in the 
eastern extents of Christchurch, areas close to waterways, and towns north of Christchurch 
such as Kaiapoi were adversely affected, predominantly due to the poor ground conditions 
(Buchanan and Newcombe, 2010), the majority of Christchurch sustained relatively minor 
damage overall (Cubrinovski and Green, 2010; Cubrinovski and Orense, 2010). 
Bruneau et al. (2010) noted that had it not been for the failures of unreinforced masonry 
buildings and damage resulting from liquefaction, the response and recovery requirements 
would have been minor. One reserve bank report estimated the cost of repairs and rebuilding 
at around NZ$5bn (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012), which is approximately five times less than 
the damage that would be caused by later earthquake events. 
Generally, damage in the CBD was limited to older brick and masonry buildings where brick 
facades collapsed, cascading bricks onto the streets. Several of the historic buildings, including 
churches built of stone were severely damaged, as were many of the old homesteads centred 
much closer to the epicentre. Generally, retrofitted URM buildings performed well with 
damage limited to parapet and chimney collapse. However, the predominant failure types of 
non-retrofitted URM buildings were parapet, chimney, and out-of-plane façade wall failure, 
and in-plane damage (Dizhur et al., 2010). 
Buchanan and Newcombe (2010) noted that for the most part, residential dwellings 
performed very well. The key damage themes were lateral spreading and 
liquefaction-induced settlements, the collapse of brick chimneys (noted as generally the 
worst-case examples of shaking induced structural damage), and like the older brick and 
masonry buildings in the CBD, the older double brick construction and heavy brick veneer 





2.3.3.4.2. 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
With respect to the extent of damage sustained to the buildings within the CBD, there are 
several published articles with differing views. Kam et al. (2011) presented statistics of CBD 
building damage following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, similar to that 
undertaken for the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake described above and notes a split 
of 58% and 42% for commercial and residential buildings, respectively, within the CBD. 
However, the categories of safety placards do not distinguish between residential and 
commercial buildings and upon review of the graphical representations from the paper, the 
revised statistics show that of the 2,721 buildings assessed, 52% were deemed green, 
24% yellow (restricted use), and 24% Red (unsafe), as per the BSE categorisation. Whilst the 
percentages reported almost match, the number of buildings vastly differs in 
Stevenson et al. (2011) who presents a total of 3,621.  
Kam et al. (2011) also goes on to discuss a further breakdown into the categories of buildings 
within the CBD and their extents of damage, the results of which are presented in Figure 2-33. 
The graphs show that of those buildings that were deemed unsafe, approximately half were 
unreinforced masonry, and equally, a similar percentage of those that were identified as 
having performed well were of timber-framed construction.  
Despite the statistics from Uma et al. (2013) being from December 2011, they do present a 
geospatial distribution of the building classifications, and are presented in Figure 2-34. 
Residential dwellings were as equally affected as commercial buildings with approximately 
15,000 structures subjected to settlement and lateral spreading caused by liquefaction. 
(Cubrinovski et al., 2011). Following the assessments of residential buildings after the 
4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake, Buchanan et al. (2011) assessed the performance 
after the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. Their work identified that whilst the 
common residential construction types performed extremely well for life safety, thousands 
had sustained structural and non-structural damage. Other generalised damage patterns 
identified were: plasterboard performed better than lath and plaster; NZS3604 slab-on-grade 
foundations had insufficient stiffness to bridge severe land deformation; and irrespective of 






   
Figure 2-33: Comparison of CBD building construction type and the extent of damage following the 
February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake categorised as (a) green – safe for occupancy, (b) yellow – 
restricted use, and (c) red - unsafe. Roman numerals represent the following: (i) – timber framed, 
(ii) – steel framed, (iii) – concrete framed, (iv) – infilled concrete frame, (v) – tilt-up concrete, 
(vi) – concrete walls, (vii) – unreinforced masonry, (viii) – reinforced masonry. 
 
 
Figure 2-34: Distribution of CBD building damage following the 22nd February Christchurch Earthquake 
(Uma et al., 2013). Note: black dots indicate sites that were not recorded, and red dots with a black 
































































This section presented an overview of land and infrastructure performance during the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). The available literature shows that generally, 
assessment and reporting of damage was more prevalent following the 22nd February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake and that on balance, damage was significantly greater than the 
4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake due to the location of the epicentre. 
The manifestation of liquefaction and lateral spreading was severe towards the east of the 
city due to the presence of sand and silt formed in estuarine, lagoonal, and coastal swamp 
environments that are particularly susceptible to liquefaction, paired with the shallow ground 
water table. 
For these reasons the case study site, the Taiora QEII recreation and sports centre has been 
chosen (Chapter 4). The site is known to have experienced severe liquefaction following the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, the previous sports centre building was severely 
damaged to the point it required demolishing, and there was a loss of service to the potable 
water network. Also, due to the availability of damage information relating to the potable 
water network and its taxonomy, the case study utilises a serviceability loss model 
(Section 3.2) developed by Bellagamba et al. (2018a) to demonstrate the implementation of 
the geospatial workflow. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Through the ongoing development of digital technologies and Smart Cities, Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) has identified the prospect to better collate both their own asset data, and 
building information, supplied by designers as part of the consenting process. To that end, 
this thesis, in collaboration with NextSpace Ltd. and CCC, presents a proof of concept to 
combine detailed designer-supplied BIM data with CCC assets (initially the 3 Waters network 
stored in GIS-based databases), into a geospatially referenced platform, currently codenamed 
Bruce.  
In addition to the integrated platform, this current research integrates datasets and identifies 
how a detailed digital twin of Christchurch could be utilised in citywide analysis with a focus 
on risk management and urban resilience (discussed in Chapter 5). As highlighted in 
Chapter 2, unlike most other natural hazards that have occurred in recent times, the CES 
allowed Christchurch to become a city-wide research laboratory with vast quantities of data 
being collected and catalogued for each main earthquake event. Whilst not exhaustive, the 
real-time observations of earthquake-induced land and infrastructure damage have been 
utilised in many publications and research, including a PhD thesis by Liu (2016), which 
developed a decision support framework for the wastewater network. However, for this 
thesis, the Bellagamba et al. (2018a) potable water network serviceability loss model (SLM) 
has been used, based on the more comprehensive performance dataset that was available 
(Section 2.3.3.3.2 and Appendix B.1.2), in the demonstration of the proof of concept. 
The subsequent sections in this Chapter introduce the following: 
 The SLM and Bruce, 
 The workflow undertaken to collate the data into Bruce,  
 The extraction of all relevant data,  
 The subsequent process for reading and analysing the outputs in the SLM.  
Whilst this research focusses on seismic analysis, the future works discussion in Section 5.4 
highlights potential uses in other natural hazard analysis, and other infrastructure analysis, 
such as the wastewater model by Liu (2016).  
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3.2. Serviceability Loss Model 
Bellagamba et al. (2018a) developed a series of fragility functions to model Christchurch’s 
buried potable water network performance following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake. By assessing the damage records as summarised in Appendix B.1.2 and applying 
four parameters; PGV, Cyclic Resistance Ratio (CRR), pipe material (limited to brittle or 
ductile), and pipe diameter, a series of failure rate functions were derived, assuming a Poisson 
distribution of pipeline failures (reported failures per km), with a specific functional form: 
                                                     ln(𝜆) = 𝑓0 + ∑ [𝐶𝑖(ℎ𝑖)] + 𝜖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                  (1) 
where: 
𝑙𝑛(𝜆)is the natural logarithm of the failure rate 
𝑓0(PGV) is the so-called backbone function depending on PGV 
𝐶𝑖(ℎ𝑖)  is the correction term corresponding to the i
th known model parameter, 
dependent on parameter vector ℎ𝑖  
𝑛 is the number of known parameters 
𝜖 is a zero-centred normally distributed random variable representing uncertainty of 
the model 
The failure rate functions were validated by Bellagamba et al. (2018a) in a retrospective 
analysis using a 2000 run Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS), with each run consisting of the 
following five-step process: 
1. Generate a spatially correlated, multivariate random field to sample ground motion 
residuals. 
2. Compute PGV intensity at each strong ground motion station utilising simulated 
median and generated residuals for the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
(Figure 2-27 and section 2.3.3.1). 
3. Evaluate mean failure rate and standard deviation for each pipeline based on 
experienced ground motion intensity and known characteristics of the failure rate 
model (PGV, CRR, pipe material, and pipe diameter). 
4. Sample the failure rate for each pipeline. 
5. Simulate the number of failures for each pipe segment. 
From this model, a comparison of simulated versus recorded pipe failures across the network 
was conducted, grouped by the SCIRT repair catchments, as shown in Figure 3-1 (a and b). 
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Figure 3-1: Spatial distribution of potable water network failure rates (from Bellagamba et al., 2018a) 
where (a) is the observed failure rate and (b) is the simulated failure rate 
Figure 3-1 (a and b) demonstrates that generally, the model can replicate the performance of 
the potable water network well. There are exceptions where the use of CRR under-predicts 
pipe failure in areas where soils are susceptible to severe liquefaction, such as the 
Residential Red Zone or in areas of rock fall and slope instability. Bellagamba et al. (2018a) 
noted that the use of these fragility functions and methodology could be applied to other 
distributed infrastructure components, a topic later discussed in Section 5.4. 
Bellagamba et al. (2018b) compared the MCS results with the inferred co-seismic 
performance, using global and specialised community-orientated metrics. The prediction 
results, which form the basis of comparison for this thesis, illustrate similarities with co-
seismic performance. The model shows that a significant number of buildings with a predicted 
probability connection loss of ≥0.5 are presented as disconnected from the water supply 
network (Figure 3-2 a and b). Readers are encouraged to review these papers further for 
details on the development and implementation of the fragility functions. 
 
Figure 3-2: Comparison of inferred co-seismic performance (a) and estimated water outage (b) (from 
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3.3. NextSpace and NSIS, Codenamed Bruce 
3.3.1. Introduction to Bruce 
The Christchurch City Council and NextSpace Ltd. have collaborated to develop Bruce, an 
integrated GIS and BIM web-based system to collate multi-source data into a 3D model 
(digital twin) of Christchurch’s built environment. One of the main objectives of Bruce is to 
demonstrate its capabilities as a combined asset management, consenting, and contract 
management and design tool. Bruce also presents significant research opportunities for 
investigating urban resilience to earthquake hazards. This research thesis has presented the 
opportunity to further develop data integration of research model outputs and Bruce. 
Generally, within an organisation such as CCC, the current method of storing, managing and 
exposing numerous data sources and control points is complex, complicating the process of 
accessing and amalgamating data (Figure 3-3a). Bruce’s use of a bidirectional link manager 
and universal data access language allows for the easy transference and accessibility of data, 
irrespective of their format, meaning that Bruce can recognise and transpose data from 
existing tools and sources. By acting as the connection between existing data, Bruce enables 
stakeholders to share, view, and manage; large datasets that are both current and relevant 
(see Figure 3-3b).  
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Figure 3-3: Smart City data management where (a) is a generalisation of current complex data sharing 
models and (b) is a model using Bruce (Nextspace Limited, 2018)  
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As updates and modifications are made to the source data, they are seamlessly and 
automatically updated within the interface, meaning that an action need only be carried out 
once for all linked sources to recognise the change. This significantly reduces time, cost, effort 
and the potential for errors. However, to achieve this, strict adherence to format versions and 
protocols around the meaning and use of “revisions” and “versions” is required. 
The methodology seen in Figure 3-3 (b) further develops the work by Lapierre and Cote (2007) 
and continues to overcome the BIM and GIS ontology integration issues identified in 
Section 2.2.4, whereby for one to view the multi-format datasets, no conversion from one 
platform to another is required. Whilst visually, Bruce provides a representation of the 
connectivity between building and utilities, the current model does not contain metadata and 
unique values for these connections, predominantly due to an inconsistency in provision of 
this data because of a lack of a national mandate. For the purpose of the analysis in this thesis, 
the lack of this connection data does not have an impact on the methodology, as it is not one 
of the input parameters. However, as is discussed later in this thesis (Section 5.4.2), this data 
would be vital if the SLM were to be improved by modelling settlement of buildings, as these 
connections become points of weakness where the heavier building is more likely to settle 
more than the utility. Similarly, they provide an additional damage mechanism and potential 
for service loss within the private laterals, another functionality the current SLM does not 
have. 
For researchers, Bruce is a powerful data storage facility, acting as a one-stop-shop for an 
array of potential analyses (later discussed in Section 5.4). The section below provides a 
high-level overview as to how Bruce reads and displays the various data sources and how it 
acts as a “streaming service” for stakeholders to obtain required information. 
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3.3.2. Overview of the Bruce Interface and its Connection to Data 
The User Interface (UI) developed by NextSpace Ltd is an html JavaScript platform allowing 
the user to quickly and efficiently design data schemas, connect them to various data sources, 
and perform static and real-time streaming of those data. The UI-associated administration 
tool provides the means to filter, manage, sort, and edit assets and data schemas; it also 
enables mapping multiple schemas into many to one, and many to many relationships 
between existing entity types and imported data. The four main classification categories 
within Bruce for managing various integratable file formats are (see also Figure 3-4): 
 Entity Type: Classification system for grouping similar entities together e.g. horizontal 
infrastructure, vertical infrastructure, building parcels, land information. 
 Entity: These are each of the files/objects uploaded into Bruce e.g. an as-built BIM 
model, or a raster image file. Within each entity, different LODs can be assigned and 
viewed separately i.e. a high-resolution 3D-BIM of the building exterior, or a 
low-resolution 3D-BIM of the internal structural elements such as bracing/framing. 
All entities are given unique IDs for cataloguing and cross-referencing. 
 Layer: Assigned to each entity type to allow for sub-classes e.g. vertical infrastructure 
may have layers associated with foundations, structural framing, or building exterior 
layers. Each layer can have multiple entities within them. 
 Menu Items: Each UI can have a tailored menu system, relevant to the user. For each 
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Within the UI, Bruce has several open-source base maps and digital elevation models (DEMs). 
This enables detailed geospatial data visualisation and qualitative evaluation of entities with 
respect to one another. Examples of this are discussed in Section 5.2. As part of this thesis, 
entity types that are not project/user-specific have been developed within Bruce, that can be 
applied to a national database, such as the entity types for vertical and horizontal 
infrastructure. The detailed formats of these are shown in Figure 3-5. 
Building Horizontal Infrastructure - 
From 3D BIM models





















Figure 3-5: Hierarchy of vertical and horizontal infrastructure within Bruce 
Each schema within Bruce can be specific to a created entity. Alternatively, to ensure 
consistency, a city/nationwide schema set could be established with entities mapped to them. 
For example, in the case of a nationwide database, a “building” schema could be created 
whereby a many-to-one relationship is established for “foundations”. This would allow the 
schema mapping of all variations of “foundations” labelling within each regional council’s 
database and would ensure consistency across the country. Another feature of many-to-one 
and one-to-many schema is the ability to extract and display metadata relevant to user needs, 
and is fully customisable across accounts and users (discussed further in Chapter 5). 
An account in Bruce can be defined as an organisational level UI that comprises multiple users 
with different access requirements. For example, CCC is the account owner, but the building 
consent team will have a different set of read/write privileges of data, to the asset 
management team, within the CCC UI. This is demonstrated in Figure 3-6 where a BIM sample 
metadata output shows “User A” has a schema referencing fields 1 and 3, but the schema of 
“User B” has fields 2 and 4. Within Bruce, as previously mentioned in 3.3.1, the original data 
remains unchanged from the source, but tailored schema are developed between each user’s 
“view” to create project/user-specific interfaces.   
Chapter 3 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































—The Proposed Geospatial Workflow 
105 
Currently, the main data sources relevant to Christchurch in the Bruce UI include the CCC WFS 
feed relating to the 3 Waters network and several CCC-owned vertical infrastructure assets in 
as-built BIM formats. The 3 Waters WFS feed is configurable, enabling user-specific schema 
mapping to equivalent Bruce entities whilst identifying geospatial and geometry data from 
within the WFS fields to display as points, lines/polylines and polygons. Real-time updates of 
source data and any associated revisions are possible through automation of ETL 
(Extract Translate Load) processes, if workflows and protocols are followed. At present, Bruce 
has a workflow involving .kml, .kmz, .glb, and .ifc file extensions. This process has been used 
as part of the case study presented in Chapter 4. 
The primary purpose of Bruce is to manage existing data connections and provide a process 
for separating, opening, and editing data, whilst ensuring robustly links are maintained in 
Bruce between the source data and any subsequent visual proxy formats. This process is 
explained further in Chapter 4. Bruce also has the means to create relationships between 
entities by applying rules and searching for attributes within multiple datasets. Equally, the 
search and rule functions can be based on fuzzy data and complete nearest neighbour 
searches on features such as ends of pipes. The predominant hindrance with any rule-based 
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3.4. Geospatial Workflow Model 
Using the nomenclature from Section 2.2.4, Bruce can be considered a combination of several 
processes. At its core, it is a hybrid data level and process level integration tool.  
Beginning with the data sources and control points at the top of the workflow, these 
represent each of the connections between the various datasets and Bruce through micro 
services (the “streaming” component) as shown in Figure 3-3b. Bruce uses semi-automatic 
conversion, translation, and extension methods to translate semantic data into a 
Bruce-specific schema, that attempts to closely resemble the source schema as much as 
possible. During this time, the source data is also given a Unique ID, the initial part of the ETL 
process presented in Section 2.2.4.1. 
From these connections, a “mirror” of the data is transposed, retaining all semantics and 
format of the original data, minimising data loss whilst translating the “mirror” into a suitable 
format for the html JavaScript platform to process. This is achieved in a similar manner to 
Lapierre and Cote (2007), in that Bruce uses WFS as a means of linking to some of the source 
data (in the example of this thesis, the CCC 3 waters network data, discussed later in 
Chapter 4). The semantic and geometric data are separated as shown by the first blue process 
boxes in the workflow below, using a methodology comparable to Amirebrahimi et al. (2015) 
as shown in Figure 2-20.  
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The outputs from the first process are shown in the workflow as a .glb geometry file and a 
.csv/.txt file, which contains attribute and semantic information from the BIM IFC data. 
The geometric outputs are assigned to an entity type (Figure 3-5). Where Bruce differs from 
the methodologies presented in Chapter 2 is through the ability to separate the geometric 
data into sub layers, based on the semantic data, for interrogation. This becomes a key 
feature, particularly with ensuring the semantic data is consistent or at least mapped to a 
consistent schema when developing a Digital City (Section 2.2.5.4), a topic discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
The next stage of the workflow combines the translated semantic and geometric data into 
Bruce so that within the visualisation tool, the two datasets are linked. This also closes out 
the ETL process whereby the unique ID assigned to the translated file is linked back to the 
source data for cross-referencing and for monitoring revisions and updates. Once the 
integrated datasets are in Bruce, Bruce has the functionality to query and filter any of the 
semantic data that has been indexed for external analysis in computational engines, examples 
of which are presented in the green boxes at the end of the workflow.  
Finally, to close out the workflow, outputs from computational engines can be uploaded back 
into Bruce for visual interrogation and for use in compounded analysis (i.e. these results could 
be exported by another researcher and incorporated with other semantic data, thereby 
providing a reiterative research engine). 
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.ifc – Industry Foundation Class file extension
.glb – graphic library binary file extension
.csv – comma separated value file extension
.txt – plain text file extension
BIM – Building Information Model
CCC – Christchurch City Council
ETL – Extract, Translate, Load
GIS – Geographic Information System
LOD – Level of Development
NZGD – New Zealand Geotechnical Database
PGV – Peak Ground Velocity
UCan – University of Canterbury
UI – User Interface
WFS – Web Feature Service
 
Figure 3-7: Geospatial workflow
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4.1. Introduction 
To demonstrate the proposed workflow, a site has been chosen where building and 
infrastructure data were readily available and in a format suitable for integration into Bruce. 
To that end, the new Taiora: QEII Recreation and Sport Centre, which opened in 2018, was 
selected. The CCC provided as-built BIM data that contained the majority of the main building, 
and some of the horizontal infrastructure exiting the building. Along with this, a connection 
to the 3 Waters WFS feed was established to obtain network data surrounding the case study 
site. The raw data posed several challenges posed by: file format, geo-referencing and 
incomplete data, all of which required manual manipulation by the author in order to be 
usable. Further detail regarding these issues is discussed in Section 5.2.  
Once data had been appropriately formatted, X. Bellagamba (from Bellagamba et al. 2018a) 
was consulted to confirm the parameters for the serviceability loss model (SLM), ensuring a 
tailored schema could be developed to extract required data from Bruce. Also as part of this 
consultation, X. Bellagamba also provided an excerpt of his original analysis to enable 
comparison with the new analysis undertaken as part of this case study. 
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4.2. Inputs 
4.2.1. BIM Data 
The as-built BIM model was modified from its original Revit Project File extension (.rvt) to an 
eventual SAP Visual Enterprise Binary (.rh) format within SAP Visual Enterprise Author (VEA) 
(V9.0.600.6989), and was exported from VEA as binary versions of Graphic Library 
Transmission Format (glTF) files, known as .glb (Graphic Library Binary). The .glb files 
(herein referred to as entities) provide a means of sharing 3D models between different 
platforms; they are an interoperable format for transmission and loading into Bruce, due to 
the optimised download speed and load time configuration for use in mobile and web-based 
3D modelling programs (Sharpened Productions, 2018).  
As discussed in Section 4.1, the QEII BIM data, provided by CCC, were partially complete and 
had to be supplemented with .pdf plans of as-built surveys of some of the 3 Waters network. 
From this, the author of this thesis had to teach himself to manually create 3D models of 
remaining omitted 3 waters network data in SAP VEA. This was achieved by superimposing 
the laterals .pdf plans underneath the .rh file of the QEII building to complete the network 
between building and street level, for a complete digital twin of the site. These were then also 
exported as .glb files. 
To geospatially reference the .glb files of both the building and the horizontal infrastructure 
in Bruce, the .pdf plans that contain geographic projection coordinates were scaled and 
underlain beneath the 3D building model in SAP VEA. Axis origin points for each .glb entity 
were positioned over a known geospatial location, which, for the case study, was a 
storm water manhole cover to the north-west corner of the building.  
Upon completion of geospatially referencing all .glb entities, the entities were uploaded into 
the Bruce web platform via a drag and drop process, and assigned to corresponding layers 
within the “Vertical Infrastructure” and “Horizontal Infrastructure” entity types, as per 
Figure 3-5. The Vertical Infrastructure entity type is currently defined by four layers, 
“external” (Figure 4-1), “internal” and “foundations” (Figure 4-2) and “structural”. 
Figure 4-3 presents the electrical, fire, potable water and wastewater infrastructure entities 
within their matching layers of the “horizontal infrastructure” entity type, and the 3 Waters 
network from the BIM model, showing the internal network connected to the private laterals 
is shown in Figure 4-4.  
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4.2.2. GIS Data 
As of March 2019, NextSpace Ltd. were still completing work on the CCC 3 Waters WFS feed 
to update the connection to Bruce, and integrating the points/lines/polylines/polygons 
conversion tool, as defined in Figure 3-7. As a temporary measure to overcome this for the 
analysis presented here, .csv extractions from the WFS feed were carried out, filtered by a 
specified area surrounding the case study site.  
The exported .csv file was in an unsuitable format for Bruce and the SLM. Each set of 
coordinates were in a string of text in a single spreadsheet cell for each pipe, and needed to 
be separated so that each coordinate pair were in their own row (Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6). 
This required a significant amount of post-extraction manipulation in Excel. Once this was 
achieved, the amended .csv file was in a format suitable for upload into Bruce.  
Pipe ID Geometry (NZTM2000) 
1304 1576153.02375115 5183623.21161937 1576151.78124746 5183623.13462408 
1305 1576143.6094993 5183623.23141695 1576151.78124746 5183623.13462408 
Figure 4-5: Pipe ID and coordinate format of WFS feed .csv extraction 
Pipe ID Easting (NZTM2000) Northing (NZTM2000) 
1304 1576153.02375115 5183623.21161937 
1304 1576151.78124746 5183623.13462408 
1305 1576143.6094993 5183623.23141695 
1305 1576151.78124746 5183623.13462408 
Figure 4-6: Pipe ID and coordinate format of WFS feed, post-manipulation 
From this, each set of co-ordinate reference points for each pipe were grouped with a points 
to path processing tool in QGIS (V3.4.4-Madeira) to create polylines representing each pipe. 
These were saved as three static .kml files grouped by network type 
(potable water, wastewater and storm water) and uploaded into Bruce. During this process, 
the .kml files were exported with a different Coordinate Reference System (CRS), as the raw 
data uses New Zealand Transverse Mercator (NZTM) as the geographic projection; Bruce, 
however, uses WGS84 as the default projection. Following the workflow in Figure 3-7, .kml 
files that were created were mapped to a schema in Bruce so that the .csv metadata could be 
filtered and extracted. The results of this part of the workflow are shown in Figure 4-7.  
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4.2.3. Integrating GIS and BIM in Bruce 
During this data preparation phase, duplicates of the 3 Waters private connections were 
created in both .glb and .kml due to the WFS feed being updated. As an additional exercise 
both sets of data were uploaded to Bruce to test the degree of accuracy of each source.  
The results presented in Figure 4-8 show there are some minor disparities between locations 
of several of the pipes across the two data sources. The four predominant reasons for these 
discrepancies are: 
1. Inaccuracies with orientating and scaling as-built .pdf plans as part of the manual 
drawing process required for the private connection data (discussed in detail in 
Section 5.2). 
2. Margin of error with the coordinate referencing of the WFS feed, particularly the older 
pipe network. The BIM data/.pdf plans have a higher degree of accuracy than the WFS 
data, based on the provided surveyed plans of the manhole covers. 
3. Errors caused during the conversion between coordinate systems. The coordinate 
system in the .pdf plans (used for the geolocation of both the building and the 
connected utilities) was Mount Pleasant Circuit 2000, whereas the coordinate system 
used in Bruce is WGS84. 
4. Once the .glb files were uploaded into Bruce, the QEII building and all infrastructure 
had to be manually rotated to line up with its as-built orientation.  
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As discussed in Section 3.3.2, it is proposed that future works between NextSpace Ltd. and 
CCC involve the design of a standardised Bruce schema that will be defined based on the 
mandated requirements of as-built BIM data, supplied as part of the consenting process. 
This will include the provision of fully georeferenced data to overcome the challenges/issues 
faced above. However, for the purposes of this thesis and demonstrating the workflow, a 
manual schema for the potable water network has been developed within the Bruce admin 
UI to show the link between IFC metadata and how it is presented in Bruce (Figure 4-9).  
 
Figure 4-9: Potable water network schema created in Bruce and matched to QEII BIM data 
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4.2.4. Serviceability Loss Model Inputs 
The fragility functions and decision support algorithms developed by Bellagamba et al. 
(2018a; 2018b; see Section 3.2), use, along with PGV and CRR, a number of pipe 
characteristics in global and community-based metrics to assess performance and recovery 
of the water supply network. Pipe characteristics include diameter, material, and embedment 
depth, the latter of which is used to determine the Liquefaction Resistance Index (LRI) value 
(subsequently used in the calculated CRR value). Global metrics measure population, utility 
of buildings and the number of buildings deprived of water, meanwhile specialised metrics 
quantify the business, medical, school, and critical buildings deprived of water. The majority 
of these parameters can either be directly obtained or easily modified from the data 
contained within Bruce. From the BIM and 3 Waters data, the following attributes were 
extracted directly from Bruce: 
1. Latitude and longitude for each end of each pipe, or where there is a change in 
orientation, 
2. Latitude and longitude for the case study building, 
3. Pipe diameter. 
“Material type” was able to be directly obtained and used without transformation from the 
WFS feed as this was the same database used for the original analysis by 
Bellagamba et al. (2018a). However, for “material type” from the BIM data, post-extraction 
manipulation was required due to the highly detailed description, into either the “brittle” or 
“ductile” variants for the fragility function model. Similarly, the LRI had to be determined 
post-extraction based on pipe embedment depths provided within the data.  
The main point of difference with the data available within Bruce that was unavailable during 
the Bellagamba et al. (2018b) analysis is the topology of private connections between 
street-level services and the building. Prior to the introduction of the proof of concept in this 
thesis, these data types at an individual building level were almost non-existent in a digital 
format, and this concept forms part of the nationalised mandate later discussed in Chapter 5. 
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To prepare the data for use in the SLM, point IDs and Pipe IDs were assigned. At least two 
consequent points (Pt ID) that do not have to be collinear define each pipe, but where pipe 
junctions occur, points have to be repeated as demonstrated by Pt ID 110 and Pt ID 23 in 
Figure 4-10 below. Generally, for the data used as part of this analysis, Pt IDs are assigned to 
each set of coordinates for each end of a pipe, unless an individual pipe length exceeds 100 m 
(one of the limitations of the model) and so an additional Pt ID is added (demonstrated by 
Pt ID 24 in Figure 4-10). 
 
Figure 4-10: Pipe network preparation for Serviceability Loss Model 
The final conversion process requires the creation of a .shp file for the new QEII building to 
which the population and utility values are assigned. Coordinates are taken directly from 
within Bruce, as is the calculated footprint area. It is hoped that in the near future, as part of 
the national mandate, building use will be one of the key identifiers incorporated into the 
schema along with up-to-date census data, allowing the utility and population data also to be 
directly extracted from Bruce. All data required for the SLM was packaged up as .csv files and 
submitted to Xavier Bellagamba for analysis. 
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4.3. Analysis and Results 
To demonstrate the implementation of the workflow in Figure 3-7 and highlight its 
capabilities as an urban resilience modelling tool, the analysis conducted in this thesis has 
focused on the potable water network to assess and compare the performance of the case 
study site during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. The original building and 
services that existed at the time of the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake were 
eventually replaced due to the extent of damage they sustained. So as a means of 
comparison, the new building, and utilities were modelled under the same seismic conditions 
to assess if there would be an improvement in performance following upgrades to the 
network. Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12 show the pre and post-CES potable water network and 
building stock topology, respectively, the former categorised by material type (Table 9) 
showing the evolution of the network following the earthquakes. The author, utilising the as-
built BIM model, created the building footprint for the new QEII building (orange building in 
north-east corner of red box in Figure 4-12) manually. However, it is anticipated that as part 
of ongoing development of Bruce and the national database, an autonomous process for 
identifying, drawing and updating building footprints will be completed. 
Table 9: Definition of pipe acronyms 
Pipe type  Acronym 
Asbestos Cement AC 
American Petroleum Institute (welded steel line) API 
Cast Iron CI 
Ductile Iron DI 
Galvanised steel GALV 
High-density Polyethylene HDPE 
Low-density Polyethylene LDPE 
Medium-density Polyethylene 80  
(80 referring to the minimum required strength of 8.0MPa) 
MDPE80 
Modified Poly Vinyl Chloride MPVC 
Polyethylene PE 
Polyethylene 100  
(100 referring to the minimum required strength of 10.0MPa) 
PE100 
Poly Vinyl Chloride PVC 
Steel STEEL 
Unplasticised Poly Vinyl Chloride UPVC 
Chapter 4 
—Taiora: QEII Recreation and Sport Centre – A Case Study 
124 
 
Figure 4-11: Pre-CES potable water supply topology and building stock distributed. Red box indicates 
case study area. Yellow box indicates data discrepancy in Residential Red Zone. 
 
Figure 4-12: Post-CES potable water supply topology and building stock distributed. Red box indicates 
case study area. Yellow box indicates data discrepancy in Residential Red Zone. 
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One key observation demonstrating a need for continued data review of an integrated system 
is shown by the yellow boxes in Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12 whereby the potable water 
network data have been updated to reflect pipes removed in the Residential Red Zone. 
Houses and infrastructure in the Residential Red Zone were removed due to the land being 
unsuitable for construction. Whilst Figure 4-12 correctly depicts a lack of services in the area, 
the representation of building footprints in the yellow box demonstrates how this data source 
requires updating. This error in data highlights the need for a QA process not just within each 
entity itself, but also of relationships between different entities. 
Using the method Section 4.2, X. Bellagamba was provided the latest potable water network 
data exported from Bruce for the case study site. From this, X. Bellagamba replicated the 
processes for the SLM as described in Section 3.2 to model the performance of the latest 
potable water network data under 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake conditions. 
A comparison of the case study area was made using an excerpt from Bellagamba et al. 
(2018b) and the new analysis. The excerpt from Bellagamba et al. (2018b) and the analysis 
results were provided as .shp files which then had to be manually converted by the author to 
.kml extensions (using QGIS V3.4.4-Madeira) for upload into Bruce (Figure 4-13). The SLM 
results of the pre and post-CES building arrangements are presented in Figur and Figure 4-15. 
 
Figure 4-13: SLM results within Bruce 
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Figur and Figure 4-15 demonstrate that were the new building and supply water network 
subject to the exact same conditions as the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, they 
would perform better than the pre-CES configuration. The probability of water outage has 
dropped significantly from 65% to 29.5%, and it is considered that the predominant reason 
for this is the change in pipe material type from AC to PE100 (Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12.) 
This change with respect to Equation (1) in Section 3.2 changes the binary parameter 
identifying whether a pipe is brittle or ductile (in this case the brittle AC pipe being replaced 
for a ductile PE100 pipe). A second change in the case study site potable water network 
topology is the pipe diameter whereby the original network had typical pipe diameters of 150 
mm, whereas the newer pipelines comprise 180 mm diameter pipes.  
The detailed foundation data were also omitted from the input as-built BIM data with respect 
to potential ground improvement work that was required in line with building consent 
requirements. Based on the observed performance of the site during the CES, it is expected 
that some ground improvement method was implemented. If these data had been available, 
the CRR component of Equation (1) in Section 3.2 could have also been modified to reflect 
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4.4. Conclusions 
As of March 2019, Bruce schemas (derived either manually or by direct data/schema transfer 
from IFC files) are linked to a single entity. This means that if an individual .glb file contains 
multiple elements (i.e. one .glb file of the complete internal potable water pipe network for 
a building), and then a schema will be linked to this entity as a whole. It is not possible to 
select an individual pipe within a building unless that single pipe is its own entity. Bruce has 
not been set up this way as it would result in a significant number of entities being created 
for a single building and would likely impose substantial demand on Bruce.  
One of the main lessons from this analysis was understanding the level of detail required from 
the UI of an integrated model, and where data can be grouped within a single entity. 
For example, it might be sufficient to have a single schema for the entire internal potable 
water network within a building, as all building elements (e.g. pipes, fittings, fixtures) 
associated with the schema have their own dimension coordinates tied to the original file. 
Therefore, the function in the UI displaying data associated with an individual pipe would not 
be necessary, if accurate geospatial data tied to each element were available for exporting 
and use in external analysis. Based on the BIM model for QEII, geospatial data assigned to 
each building element is achievable if set up correctly. However, this requires consistency in 
labelling of individual building elements and high quality data management to be maintained. 
This is highlighted in the internal potable water network QEII BIM data where examples of 
pipes labelled as “potable cold water” were joined with fittings labelled as “non-potable.” 
Whilst this presents an issue when extracting the complete potable water network data from 
Bruce, and one that needs addressing (further discussed in Section 5.2.1), loss of service due 
to a pipe break within the building is currently unable to be modelled in the SLM and so had 
no impact on the analysis.  
As identified in Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12 in Section 4.3, the building footprint data had not 
been updated from the pre-CES distribution to post-CES. This was due to this dataset being 
provided as part of the excerpt from Bellagamba et al. (2018b), and not from the original 
source that was used by Bellagamba et al. (2018b). The absence of this “raw” data linkage 
also resulted in the need to draw manually the new QEII building footprint, as discussed in 
Section 4.3. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this thesis, as outlined in Section 1.3.1, was to develop and implement a workflow 
for integrating data of multiple ontologies, and utilising them in analysis for characterising the 
resilience of a digital twin of part of Christchurch City. To achieve this aim, with the assistance 
of CCC and NextSpace Ltd., a conceptual framework was developed to; identify processes 
required for integrating and “streaming” geospatial and non-geospatial data into a platform, 
and how one would visualise and access the combined data (Chapter 3). To test this workflow, 
as-built BIM data from CCC’s QEII facility were provided and augmented with the WFS data 
for the reticulated water network in the NextSpace integrated platform known as Bruce. 
From this, the serviceability loss model (SLM) developed by Bellagamba et al. (2018a; 2018b) 
was chosen as the analysis method to test the workflow’s applicability in urban resilience 
assessment. A review of the required parameters for the model was undertaken, with a 
tailored schema developed in Bruce to extract the corresponding data associated with these 
parameters, from all data sources linked to Bruce. Finally, the data exported from Bruce was 
used in the SLM to compare the post-CES QEII facility and its infrastructure, with its pre-CES 
counterpart (Chapter 4). 
This research demonstrates that the design of the new QEII facility and its infrastructure have 
improved resilience to a seismic event equivalent to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake (when compared to its predecessor). In addition, the integrated tool provides the 
ability to perform this type of analysis using a centralised database of building and 
infrastructure information, whereas previously, multiple sources were required to carry out 
the same analysis. Despite this success, this research was not completed without its 
challenges and on-the-fly adaptation being required to achieve results, along with the several 
identified limitations (Section 5.2). A lessons-learned exercise provides the opportunity for 
reflection, and identification of areas for improvement across the entire workflow as well as 
highlighting key areas of recommended future research (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Concluding 
remarks are presented in Section 5.5. 
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5.2. Limitations of the Model and Challenges Faced 
This section critically reviews the quality of the inputs to the model, the ability to implement 
the workflow, and discusses the challenges faced throughout the completion of this research. 
This will provide discussion points for areas of improvement and recommendations for future 
research (Section 5.4). 
 
5.2.1. Data Accuracy 
The first identified issue in the QEII BIM data was with naming convention of building 
elements. Inconsistency and lack of a QA process implemented on the BIM data has resulted 
in examples of potable water pipes connected to each other with pipefittings labelled as 
“non-potable” in the BIM metadata. Whilst having no impact on the visual output associated 
with the BIM, the errors within the metadata mean that if a query or filtering exercise were 
to be conducted to select/export only the potable network, the incorrectly named fittings 
would be omitted and therefore not show the complete network. To overcome this, 
draughtsman/architects are going to be required to become data managers if the provision 
of a granular, accurate metadata schema associated with a BIM model is going to be 
mandated and required on all consentable designs. Through communication with CCC, it is 
their intent to mandate the provision of a fully geospatially referenced BIM model as part of 
the building consent process, and the implementation of Industry Foundation Class (IFC) 
standards (see Section 2.2.5) would help draughtsman/architects overcome a significant 
number of the inconsistency issues highlighted. These inconsistences will also affect asset 
managers during the lifecycle of a building when provided with the as-built BIM data, 
particularly through facilities management if the incorrect non-graphic data or dimension 
data is provided and this would have a significant impact on accurately estimating costs of 
works orders and maintenance projects (Section 2.2.5.2). A secondary impact of 
inconsistencies is on earthquake impacts analysis, such as assessing ground shaking 
thresholds for triggering a loss of service within a building, where accuracy of the internal 
building network becomes vital. 
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Secondly, during the UI development in Bruce, it became apparent that using the latest DEM 
was an important consideration of an integrated tool. The CES caused differential ground 
movement and subsidence, but the DEM used in Bruce was not up-to-date to reflect these 
changes. The results were issues with depth offset of pipes where they appeared to breach 
the ground surface. This issue was further compounded in the case study where the DEM in 
Bruce was of a partially regraded site (following demolition of the previous structures). 
Along with the DEM issue, another additional step required during the development of the 
workflow, which it is hoped could be negated during future refinements to Bruce 
(Section 5.4), relates to the consistent projection system used for surveying. In addition to the 
complications of some data being provided in non-BIM format (predominantly .pdf plans), the 
files provided used multiple projection systems (Mount Pleasant Circuit 2000 and NZTM). 
Following the superimposing of .pdf plans onto the .rh file in VEA (Section 4.2.1 and further 
discussed in Section 5.2.2), the coordinates had to be converted manually into WGS84, prior 
to upload into Bruce. Even after undertaking this process there were disparities identified, 
particularly between the WFS feed and the manually drawn 3 Waters network as shown in 
Figure 4-8. Whilst it has been identified that some of these disparities are likely the result of 
the manual drawing process, errors were exacerbated by the inconsistent use of geospatial 
projections. 
The final data accuracy issues that were highlighted during implementation of the workflow 
became known during the WFS feed and BIM integration in Bruce. First, there were 
maintenance issues for the WFS source data linked to Bruce; there were examples of pipes 
inside the case study site that were still categorised as “in service” when it was known that 
these had been removed. This presents an example of an ongoing review and update 
requirement of the integrated tool, and that owners of the platform may wish to stipulate 
regular updates from users as part of a terms of use agreement, similar to the NZGD 
(NZGD, 2016), to ensure the latest data are always present (examples of platform 
maintenance are discussed in Section 5.4.1). This leads to the second maintenance 
issue/consideration identified during the workflow. Following initial data extraction by the 
author for analysis, CCC uploaded the QEII laterals connecting the building and street-level 
infrastructure pipes as part of an update to the WFS feed (due to the site being owned by CCC 
who also manage the 3 Waters network WFS feed). The update to the WFS feed provided the 
comparison with the BIM model in the identification of geospatial projection conversion 
issues discussed above, but it also emphasised the need to include a date stamp or identifier 
to alert the user of the data’s age within Bruce, especially when undertaking analysis. 
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5.2.2. Completeness of Data 
As described in Section 4.2.1, CCC provided partial as-built BIM data, limited to most of the 
main QEII building, the wastewater network, and an isolated potable water pipe exiting the 
building (but not connected to any other potable lateral). Through liaison and coordination 
with the designers (architects, engineers, etc.) of the QEII sports and recreation centre, the 
remaining missing BIM data were obtained; however, this was in .pdf format comprising 
2D plans of the 3 Waters network. From this, 3D models of remaining omitted 3 Waters 
network data were created (Section 4.2.1). This process led to many challenges such as 
accurate scaling and rotating of.pdf plans in VEA, which was the likely cause for many of the 
offsets/orientation issues shown in Figure 4-8. Similarly, as part of the manual drawing 
process, the pipes were not drawn with their corresponding depths (however, this 
information was contained within the depth metadata for the model). Therefore, visually this 
may contribute to pipes breaching the surface, as highlighted in Section 5.2.1. This process 
strayed from the workflow, as per Figure 3-7. “Business as usual” would comprise the 
provision of all project-related horizontal and vertical infrastructure in a georeferenced 
as-built BIM. This would be provided at the first level of the workflow, as part of the 
consenting process.  
Until such time when BIM data contains a geographical projection, such as IFC4 
(BuildingSMART, n.d.-a), in a national mandate for building consent applications, the 
methodology for providing a georeferenced location will continue to be a semi-manual 
process (as demonstrated by the method described in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3).  
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5.2.3. Implementation of Workflow and Analysis  
Prior to implementing the analysis, the.csv file from the WFS feed was in an unsuitable format 
for Bruce and the SLM, as described in Section 4.2.2. For the SLM analysis, the exported .csv 
file from Bruce required each coordinate pair to be assigned a ptID and Pipe ID (Figure 4-10). 
Once this was achieved, the amended .csv file was in a format suitable for use in the SLM.  
As previously stated in Section 3.3.1 , the SLM is unable to model potential breaks at the 
building/lateral connection (identified by the red circle in Figure 4-8). A potential modification 
to the SLM in order to undertake analysis on these connections is discussed further in 
Section 5.4. However, based on the available literature in Appendix B, there is limited 
information on the performance of these connections during the CES, making it difficult to 
replicate in the SLM. The most likely source of available information relating to this 
performance will be in the earthquake damage engineering reports associated with each 
building. 
Once analysis had been completed in the SLM, the final phase of the workflow in Figure 3-7 
demonstrates the integration of results back into Bruce for review, and highlights the ability 
of Bruce to serve as a centralised research repository. However, the outputs from the SLM 
were in a .shp format, one not currently supported in Bruce and so conversion of these files 
to the .kml file extension was required and undertaken in QGIS (V3.4.4-Madeira) and ArcGIS. 
Similar to the process required for the WFS feed conversion to a .kml extension (Section 4.2), 
the outputs from the SLM were in the NZTM geographic projection but through conversion 
to .kml were translated to the WGS84 projection, prior to upload to Bruce. The report by 
Kenley and Harfield (2018) has explored the use of virtual location hubs as a means of 
overcoming this issue of multiple projections, along with integration of location data from 
topological, geospatial, and geometric sources, whilst negating the need for asset users to 
undertake significant modifications to their “business-as-usual” processes. The research by 
Kenley and Harfield (2018) relates predominantly to roads and horizontal infrastructure, but 
the application of its use with BIM is also discussed. This concept is explored further in 
Section 5.4.1 as an improvement/modification to Bruce. 
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During the timeframe of this thesis research, there was significant development and 
improvements made to Bruce, based on the usability and implementation of the workflow 
from Figure 3-7. Improvements included overcoming some of the initial limitations with 
Bruce, such as the ability to upload the .kml outputs from the SLM analysis back into Bruce 
(Figur and Figure 4-15). However, the main benefit to real-time development of Bruce during 
this thesis was the ability to perform live trials of schema layouts and relationship mapping, 
through identification of key IFC metadata fields within the QEII BIM data, such as those 
shown in Figure 3-6. When reviewing the various metadata fields, consideration was given to 
other possible schema layouts that could be adopted for different analyses to the SLM 
undertaken in this thesis. These concepts are discussed further in Section 5.4.2. 
The challenges and subsequent methodologies required to overcome these challenges, as 
discussed in the preceding three sections, are due to incomplete BIM data at the time of this 
thesis. Because there is no national mandate for BIM, unlike in parts of Europe and Asia, there 
is inconsistency between consent documentation within both CCC and across New Zealand. 
Similar steps are being taken in New Zealand to those countries already with a mandate, with 
development of The New Zealand BIM Handbook (BIM Acceleration Committee, 2016), but 
currently this is the extent of nationalising a standard of practice. Once these protocols and 
requirements are enforced, the need to manually add data, as was required for this thesis, 
would be negated. 
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5.3. Implications for Urban Resilience 
One of the fundamental benefits identified through this work is how a city-wide digital twin 
presents the opportunity for digital integration of a city’s assets into a single-source viewing 
platform such as Bruce, and integration of both risk and resilience frameworks. The examples 
of analysis shown in Figure 3-7 demonstrate how a digital twin allows for cataloguing and 
assessment of a city’s as-built infrastructure taxonomy (assuming the databases are 
maintained) with a focus on the associated interdependency matrices (Figure 1-2). In parallel 
to this and as part of the post-disaster matrix assessment, Bruce provides the ability to 
manipulate the ontology of a city’s building/infrastructure for use in a cost-benefit analysis of 
improvements to critical systems and lifelines as part of operations and maintenance 
budgeting, whilst modelling the impact of high risk, low probability events (Section 1.2.2).  
The applicability of the data in Bruce and the various analyses that can be conducted is not 
just limited to academic researchers and asset managers for urban resilience assessment. 
Other stakeholders include: 
 The Insurance Council who could assess liability to aid with premiums calculations, 
 Infrastructure lifelines groups, the MCDEM, and emergency services for hazard 
response and route planning.  
 All building consent authorities (if the platform was held nationally) as a national 
repository of all building consents. 
Urban resilience is not just limited to seismic hazards, and as discussed in Section 2.2.5.3 and 
demonstrated by the workflow, any combination of datasets can be extracted from the digital 
twin of Christchurch in Bruce. Equally, other datasets can be imported. For example, tide 
information could be included and this, exported with finished floor heights of buildings, 
could be used in flood and sea-level rise analysis with the results imported back into Bruce as 
a visual input showing affected properties. Similar visuals and analyses could also be 
developed for tsunami and storm events. 
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5.4. Model Refinements and Future Work 
This thesis has developed and demonstrated the implementation of a geospatial workflow 
that integrates digital technologies for use in assessing urban resilience. The integrated 
platform’s ability to visualise and store these datasets, and to their use in external analysis, 
shows significant potential with the results of the SLM analysis. This highlights the usefulness 
and ease of having the latest available data in a centralised location. However, the SLM is a 
representation of just one form of analysis that can be undertaken using a subset of data 
contained within Bruce. This research also shows how the Bruce UI can be customised for how 
data are accessed and displayed (or hidden) depending on, user requirements, project 
scope/objective, and security (e.g. privacy restrictions, read/write privileges). The following 
sections present areas of ongoing improvement to Bruce from its initial first version, as well 
as proposed topics of research that could utilise the capabilities that Bruce has. 
 
5.4.1. Improvements to Bruce 
The workflow developed in this research enables an array of analyses to be conducted, 
utilising any combination of data contained within Bruce. Presently, data in Bruce are limited 
to vertical and horizontal infrastructure in both BIM and GIS formats, (the latter limited to the 
3 Waters network outside of private laterals) as used in Chapter 4. The first step to producing 
a complete digital twin of a city is to ensure all infrastructure is represented in Bruce, including 
the electrical distribution networks, telecommunications, and roads. As discussed in 
Appendix A, ownership and management of the horizontal infrastructure varies between 
purely government-owned and partially/fully privatised. Therefore, coordination, “buy-in,” 
and any intellectual property or security protocols need to be carefully considered as part of 
the integration and ongoing ownership of Bruce. 
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The analysis undertaken by Bellagamba et al. (2018a; 2018b) utilised ground motion data and 
geotechnical parameters (CRR and LSI) from secondary sources (currently unavailable 
in Bruce), that are only applicable to Christchurch. However, research by Grasso and Maugeri 
(2003) demonstrated the means of assessing the seismic geotechnical hazard of historical 
buildings by using the nearest available geotechnical data (taken from a dataset of 
910 boreholes). An area of future development for Bruce, utilising both the work by 
Grasso and Maugeri (2003) and the comprehensive New Zealand Geotechnical Database 
(NZGD, 2016), might include the integration of data from the NZGD in order to be able to 
perform similar analysis, anywhere in New Zealand where such data are available.  
A proposed QA methodology for Bruce could utilise evolving artificial intelligence (AI) 
technologies, which include the ability to perform verification/error identification analysis of 
BIM models whereby erroneous features such as “vertical floors” and structural beams with 
no function are identified (L. Ross, personal communication, October 4, 2018). This could be 
implemented into Bruce as a means of quickly identifying errors for large volumes of data 
over a wide area, for example identifying all unconnected pipes, or infrastructure clashes 
where building elements intersect (i.e. a potable water pipe passing through a wastewater 
pipe because depths of the two have been incorrectly entered).  
Similarly, as part of the QA process within Bruce, contractors and subcontractors could be 
provided the means to update as-built data in Bruce, whilst undertaking a works order for 
maintenance to a buried utility. Contractor/subcontractor-specific profiles (a feature which is 
already present in Bruce) could be assigned and either data are updated directly into Bruce 
via desktop computer or, through the development of a smartphone/tablet-based app, data 
are populated whilst on site and submitted with a geospatially referenced location to Bruce. 
Once data have been uploaded, there is then the option of notifying the Bruce account owner 
(such as CCC) of new/updated data for review prior to release into Bruce. Alternatively, the 
data would seamlessly update Bruce directly from the app, but still notify the account owner 
of the new data for them to verify and amend accordingly. 
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As previously noted in Section 4.2, there were some completeness and accuracy issues 
relating to the Coordinate Reference Systems (CRS) used between the different datasets and 
a predominantly manual process was required in order to collate them in Bruce. 
NextSpace Ltd. have proposed to soon embed a tool in Bruce that can either autonomously 
recognise all input geographic coordinates and convert to WGS84, or have the user select the 
input reference system prior to conversion. Concerning BIM data, to geospatially reference 
these data, at least one known coordinate will be required. Section 2.2.4.2 discussed the 
development of IFC4, which includes new fields for geospatial referencing 
(“IfcGeographicElement” and “IfcGeographicElementType”) which, if implemented, would 
assist with the integration of a BIM model into Bruce. However, to geospatially reference all 
elements of a BIM model, either all elements will require the “IfcGeographicElement” and 
“IfcGeographicElementType” fields to be populated, or the use of a secondary tool to 
translate geometric data into geospatial, similar to the research by Kenley and Harfield (2018) 
and Deng et al. (2016). 
Still to be identified as a mandated requirement of an as-built BIM model are metadata 
standards associated with fittings/valves connecting the building to private laterals, 
categorised as exterior nodes by Hijazi et al. (2011) and mapped in GIS by Schultz (2012) 
(However, the latter were grouped to the relevant pump station and not given their own 
referenced individual entity). This may appear a trivial component to a BIM model 
designer/contractor. However, as shown by the analysis in this thesis and discussed further 
in the following section, these metadata become vital in a modified SLM analysis of city-wide 
urban resilience for service loss due to breaks at these connections. 
Finally, a more commercially-based use potentially applicable from an integrated tool such as 
Bruce would utilise the accurate subsurface infrastructure network information as a 
pre-excavation safety tool. For those undertaking operation and maintenance works to 
subsurface infrastructure, conventionally requests are submitted for generally outdated and 
incomplete 2D plans. By licensing read-only access to works-specific data within Bruce, the 
degree of risk for a service strike is reduced. It is acknowledged that this would not negate 
the need to do on-site assessment, such as ground penetrating radar, but would provide 
additional confidence in pre-excavation health and safety management plans. 
Additionally, accountability would be a significant consideration if damage to a utility were to 
occur. The benefit of Bruce is that it is fully auditable as to when data were uploaded and by 
whom, linking this back to the proposed future improvement relating to 
contractors/subcontractors updating data whilst on-site through use of an app. 
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5.4.2. Future Research Utilising Bruce’s Capabilities 
For transparency, the following recommended research topics are designed to use the 
existing/proposed data housed within Bruce and that Bruce’s functionality should be treated 
as a data portal, not a computational engine.  
As described in the preceding section, the methodology by Bellagamba et al. (2018a; 2018b) 
utilises a Christchurch-specific geotechnical performance metric in the SLM. In order to 
modify this analysis and make it applicable to other parts of New Zealand or internationally, 
a different ground condition parameter would be required. To achieve this, ground 
investigation data from the NZGD and other data, such as the PGA/PGV data from 
Section 2.3.3.1, could be linked to Bruce (using the method in Figure 3-3). This would provide 
the ability to export both datasets from Bruce, and undertake citywide liquefaction analysis 
(in an external computational engine) for the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. 
By adopting a similar method as Grasso and Maugeri (2003), of utilising the nearest 
geotechnical and PGA/PGV data to each object (e.g. building or utility), predicted 
liquefaction-induced settlement could be calculated. In addition to this, the data contained 
within BIM models and WFS feeds would allow a more accurate determination of embedment 
depth of pipes which in turn, with geotechnical investigation data (e.g. CPTS, boreholes, test 
pits) would enable targeted liquefaction analysis of critical embedment zones. From this, 
a new series of fragility functions would be derived using the remaining parameters from the 
SLM (Section 3.2) and tested against both the observed and simulated failure rate from 
Figure 3-1. If this methodology demonstrates a better correlation, then a series of simulations 
could be modelled for an AF8 event utilising ongoing research (MCDEM, 2019). Presently, 
both the original SLM and the proposed modified SLM do not account for lateral spreading 
and so further research would be required to determine how this could be factored into 
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Applying as-built foundation data contained within Bruce and combining with the proposed 
liquefaction analysis above, a similar set of city-wide fragility functions could be derived for 
building performance, leveraging off data gathered on building performance during the CES 
(Section B.2 Henderson, 2013). Again, if this is proven to model observed performance with 
an acceptable degree of accuracy, then as per the recommendation for AF8 scenario analysis 
of horizontal infrastructure, the same could be applied to vertical infrastructure utilising all 
BIM-derived as-built foundation data in Bruce. Building foundation performance using AF8 
ground motion with the integrated CPT and borehole data in Bruce could produce liquefaction 
susceptibility maps for Christchurch, with a focus on the critical foundation embedment 
zones. Combining this analysis with the known/estimated building foundation embedment 
depth from the BIM data, would provide the ability to model building foundation 
performance for a simulated event with respect to liquefaction-induced bearing capacity 
failure. It is acknowledged that currently in Christchurch, there are very few examples of 
as-built BIM models for commercial structures and none identified for residential buildings, 
so performing this type of analysis presently is in its infancy. It is also recognised that generally 
this would only be available to new builds that have BIM models generated. However, whilst 
there are examples of retrospective BIM models being generated for existing structures using 
3D scanner technologies and point clouds (Centofanti et al., 2011; Dore and Murphy, 2012; 
InteliBuild, 2016; Yang et al., 2012), these only provide representations of above-ground 
superstructures. Unless invasive investigations are carried out to determine the foundation 
characteristics, these would have to be assumed in any analysis. The same also applies for 
buried lifeline systems and it is recognised that the costs associated with retrospective data 
collection for an entire city’s network is likely to be a very costly exercise. 
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Combining the analysis for foundation performance with the recommended improvement to 
Bruce for building to lateral connections, as per the research by Hijazi et al. (2011), would 
provide the means to model service loss due to building movement at these connections, and 
where there are physical breaks within the horizontal infrastructure networks. 
Research would be required into retrospectively categorising the types of failures that 
occurred at the building/lateral connections for particular earthquake events during the CES. 
However, this is very difficult to assess, as it is highly unlikely that this type of damage and 
performance information is readily available at an individual building level. An alternative 
methodology might include determining the yield point of various material or connection 
types, and testing magnitudes of deflection when subjected to varying degrees of shaking. 
Again, this carries a high degree of uncertainty due to the inability to compare with observed 
performance during the CES. In the event that a suitable model is developed, citywide analysis 
could be conducted using the various integrated datasets within Bruce. For example, 
a simplistic model could analyse that if predicted settlement of building/lateral connection 
“A” is X mm, and X mm>Y mm, where Y is the maximum degree of deflection for connection 
type “B”, then pipe connection fails = loss of service. All connection types could be classified 
using the BIM data whereby they are mapped to a schema that identifies them as 
“exterior nodes” in line with Hijazi et al. (2011). 
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A secondary function of mapping/classifying all exterior nodes is the ability to undertake 
urban resilience modelling for various hazard or service outage scenarios. For example, if a 
fully realised digital twin of a city were able to identify affected buildings from a break in the 
network immediately adjacent to a pump station, this would provide the means to identify 
suburbs/regions/streets at highest risk according to the size and characteristics of the 
affected population.  
The above proposed research topics are focussed on the currently available digital twin data 
within Bruce in both a BIM and GIS format and the SLM analysis method, which has focussed 
on the potable network performance. As discussed throughout this thesis, there is published 
and ongoing research into the performance of the other horizontal infrastructure networks 
such as telecommunications, electrical distribution networks, and wastewater (Cavalieri et 
al., 2014a; Cavalieri et al., 2014b; Cubrinovski et al., 2014; Giovinazzi et al., 2011; Kwasinski 
et al., 2014; Massie and Watson, 2011; New Zealand Lifelines Council [NZLC], 2017; O'Rourke 
et al., 2012). Once the digital representations of these networks are included in a platform 
such as Bruce, similar integrated analyses can be conducted for these datasets. Equally, whilst 
this thesis has concentrated on seismic analysis of the built environment with respect to 
urban resilience, Bruce lends itself as a tool for alternative hazard analysis such as river and 
surface flooding, tsunami and sea-level rise, along with impacts of technological failures.  
Finally, one of the overarching benefits of Bruce, combining all the above improvement and 
future research suggestions, is how it can be used as a highly detailed asset management tool. 
Along with assessment of assets, Bruce is also able to model the performance in response to 
various hazard analyses through being able to query and filter data geospatially. Whilst this 
may already be achievable in pure GIS environments, Bruce differs in its highly detailed 3D 
environment, providing an almost lossless BIM model in a geospatial environment. This was 
demonstrated in the case study where the BIM data for QEII had private lateral connection 
data, providing a direct linkage between privately and publicly owned assets. 
  
Chapter 5 
—Discussion and Summary 
145 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has made a methodological contribution to digital engineering and urban resilience 
assessment with a focus on seismic hazards by demonstrating a workflow for integrating 
different infrastructure datasets into a single-source platform and analysing their 
performance during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. 
The fundamental concern with analysis on a large scale such as this is quality and accuracy of 
data entered into the model. The benefits to having regional or national government 
maintaining a city/national digital twin include their resources such as in-house expertise 
(GIS experts and building consent officers who would be reviewing the BIM mandated 
consent data), and that regional and district councils own much of the horizontal 
infrastructure assets, making it easier to integrate with platforms such as Bruce. However, in 
order to “build” an accurate digital twin, vast amounts of data need to be collated into a single 
viewing/analysis platform, a task that could be problematic when coordinating external 
stakeholders. 
This leads into the next biggest challenge, which will be buy-in from the other infrastructure 
asset owners such as electrical distribution and telecommunications. Bruce has demonstrated 
that it can provide secure linkages to source data, but hesitation to contribute data may arise 
from encroaching into the realms of sensitive/confidential information. However, the 
uniqueness of a tool such as Bruce is its adaptability and ability to be tailored on an individual 
account, user, and project basis. Since Bruce has the means to map relationships to the source 
data (such as the WFS feed) whilst also storing some data on its own cloud-based storage 
facilities, project and/or user-specific UIs and access/editing rights can be assigned, 
maintaining security and accountability. Equally, the benefits to a collaborative and single 
integrated platform containing all vertical and horizontal infrastructure data are 
demonstrated by the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Using just one of the lifeline systems 
connected to a single building in the model, and illustrating the ease of extracting integrated 
data and how to analyse loss of service during a seismic event, highlights the capabilities of 
Bruce and its other potential applications. Bruce can be used as an asset management 
modelling tool for assessing asset degradation of an entire network, or identify the weakest 
areas of the network that could benefit from being repaired or upgraded, and provide 
confidence in cost as part of operations and maintenance budgeting.  
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The response by emergency services, MCDEM, and the efforts of the utilities companies to 
restore service in the wake of an event such as the CES was testimony to the rapid recovery 
of those key lifeline facilities. However, one of the key observations was the delay in visible 
manifestation of a network break, particularly in the electrical distribution network, and the 
deeply embedded 3 Waters infrastructure (predominantly wastewater). Therefore, as a 
means of modelling urban resilience, the performance of Christchurch during a magnitude 
8.0 Mw  earthquake (such as an Alpine Fault type event;MCDEM, 2019) could be conducted in 
multiple computational engines, utilising any number of the data sources in Bruce. The data 
exported from Bruce, combined with the vast damage records collected during the CES, could 
be used to develop a range of fragility functions, providing the ability to assess the as-built 
infrastructures expected performance during an AF8 type event. 
At present both the SLM and Bruce are specific to Christchurch, particularly the SLM as it uses 
a geotechnical parameter only applicable to Christchurch. As discussed in this thesis, the 
model could be revised to utilise non-geographic specific parameters such as predicted 
liquefaction-induced settlement, which would allow fragility functions to be developed for 
other major populated centres both domestically and internationally, provided similar 
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A.1. Horizontal Infrastructure Network 
Within Christchurch, ownership of the horizontal infrastructure networks varies. The 3 Waters 
facilities (potable water, wastewater, and storm water) are owned and operated by CCC. 
National electricity is distributed by the state-owned entity Transpower New Zealand Ltd., 
whilst Orion New Zealand Ltd., joint-owned by CCC and Selwyn District Council, operates the 
electricity network in Christchurch. Telecommunications infrastructure includes the networks 
operated by companies such as Enable Networks Limited and Spark (formerly Telecom) 
(CCC,  2018). 
The National Engineering Lifelines Committee (NELC), Local Lifelines groups, the Earthquake 
Commission, and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), 
promote the importance of lifeline resilience, which is further enforced with the Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management (CDEM) Amendment Act 2016 (CDEM, 2016). The Act amended 
the previous CDEM Act of 2002 which required lifeline utilities “to be able to function to the 
fullest possible extent,” even to a reduced level, during and after an emergency. The NELC 
focuses on collaboration with lifeline utility representatives, engineers, scientists and 
emergency managers to provide a framework for the integration of asset, risk, and emergency 
management across utilities. 
Prior to the CES, significant assessment of the Christchurch metropolitan area lifelines was 
undertaken (Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, 1997). Following the report, all sectors 
including transportation, 3 Waters, electrical, and communications underwent enhancing the 
resiliency of lifelines. The following sections present an overview of the horizontal 
infrastructure in Christchurch, focussing on the 3 Waters and electricity networks. 
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 Electrical Distribution Network 
Transpower is the national supplier of electrical power in New Zealand, transmitting high 
voltages from generating sites to demand centres. Orion, the third largest power distribution 
company in New Zealand, conveys power from Transpower demand centres to end-user 
customers across Christchurch City and the surrounding Canterbury area. Transpower’s five 
Christchurch transmission grid exit points (GXPs) transform power from 200 kV to 66 kV, 
33 kV, and 11 kV, distributed through the network operated by Orion. Orion (2010) provided 
the best source of data for the value and composition of their network prior to the CES as 
summarised below. 
The 66 kV network made up approximately 1% of Orion’s network within Christchurch and 
had an estimated Optimised Depreciation Replacement Cost (ODRC) of NZ$33m. The cables 
spanned 63 km and were generally made up of either: radial pairs of 3-core aluminium, oil 
filled, aluminium sheathed cables (87% or 55km); or 3X1 core copper, cross-laminated 
polyethylene (XLPE) cables. 
There was approximately 25 km of 33 kV cable (0.5% of the network), predominantly in the 
western part of Christchurch City. The ODRC of the 33 kV network was roughly NZ$5.6m and 
comprised the following three types: 
 km oil filled (installed 1967-1977), 
 km Paper Insulated Lead-Covered, Armoured (PILCA) (installed 1978-1988), 
 19 km XLPE (installed 1992-2007). 
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The 11 kV network formed the second largest underground asset type in Orion’s network, 
with an ODRC of NZ$212.6m, comprised approximately 2,200-2,300 km of cable (45% of the 
total network), 99.6% of which was in urban Christchurch. Like the 33 kV network, the 11 kV 
cables were either PILCA or XLPE, with copper or aluminium cores, and high-density 
polyethylene (HDPE) or PVC outer protective jackets. The approximate breakdown of the 
cable type and length are summarised below (Kongar et al., 2017): 
 1,491 km of PILCA, 
 380 km of XLPE, 
 59 km of PILCA HDPE, 
 370 km unknown type.  
The Orion network fed into 15 district/zone substations in and around Christchurch City as 
shown in Figure A-1. 
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District/zone substations transform 66 kV (or 33 kV) power to 11 kV as well as linking the sub-
transmission system and distribution substations (Figure A-2). 11 kV power is taken from 
either a district/zone, network, or alternative distribution substation, to supply the 
consumer’s 400 V voltage distribution system.  
 
Figure A-2: Orion network voltage level/asset relationships (Orion, 2010) 
Making up 52% of Orion’s network (2,522 km of distribution cable) with an ODRC of 
NZ$232.7m, the 400 V network is the main source of power distribution to its customers. 
Pre-1966, most of the cables were paper lead/PILCA-based after which, the introduction of 
PVC insulation replaced some of these older cables. From 1974 onwards, the 400 V network 
was built using XLPE cables. Also included as part of the 400 V network were approximately 
5,500 above ground link boxes and 26,000 above ground boundary boxes, which sent the 
electricity supply to customers. 
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 The Water Network 
For the land drainage network, CCC maintained approximately 500 km of pipeline ranging 
from 0.1- 2.1 m in diameter. These pipes were predominantly reinforced concrete rubber ring 
jointed (RCRRJ) as well as perforated subsoil pipes, ceramic, asbestos cement, and single and 
double skin “brick barrel” pipes (Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, 1997). Figure A-3 
shows the known layout of the open tributary, brick barrel, and >0.45 m diameter piped 
waterway networks at the time of the Risks and Realities report (Christchurch Engineering 
Lifelines Group, 1997).  
 
Figure A-3: Storm water system extract (Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, 1997) 
Cubrinovski et al. (2014) summarised the dataset of geocoded files for 1,900 km of 
wastewater distribution pipelines collected through reconnaissance and assessment 
undertaken by SCIRT, the results of which are reproduced in Table 10. 
Table 10: Christchurch City sewer infrastructure (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) 
Material type Gravity main Pressure main Other Total length (km) 
AC 138 34 1 173 
BB 6 – – 6 
CI 15 5 1 21 
CONC 768 24 4 796 
EW 381 0 0 381 
HDPE 15 3 3 21 
MDPE80 1 5 0 6 
MPVC 3 19 0 22 
OTHER 43 4 15 62 
PVC 45 5 1 51 
UPVC 310 49 1 360 
Total 1,725 148 26 1,899 
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Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group (1997) discussed a potable water network of 
1,300 km of pipes, fed by 84 pumping stations and 37 service reservoirs. Pumping stations 
draw water from five underground aquifers at depths between 22 m and 190 m below ground 
level (bgl). They also noted that the city is predominantly split into five supply zones, each 
with differing pressures however; in an emergency, the valves at zone boundaries can be 
opened to connect all zones.  
Cubrinovski et al. (2014) also presented the topology of the submain and crossover network 
of the potable water network, which presents a 400 km difference in the mains network from 
the values reported in Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group (1997). The discrepancies 
between both are likely due to the installation of new networks in the time between the two 
sources. Table 11 presents the breakdown of material and pipe type for the mains water from 
Cubrinovski et al. (2014).  
Table 11: Christchurch water mains infrastructure (Cubrinovski et al., 2014) 
Material type Trunk mains Mains Submain Crossovers Total length (km) 
AC 5 850 15 1 871 
CI 0 189 0 0 189 
CLS 14 38 0 – 52 
DI 0 52 0 – 52 
GI – 2 154 30 186 
HDPE – 0 845 69 914 
MDPE80 – 5 413 40 458 
MPVC – 148 1 0 149 
Other 0 27 14 0 41 
PVC 0 315 68 4 387 
SRS 10 24 0 0 34 
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A.2. Vertical Infrastructure 
Prior to the CES, the reported residential dwelling stock of Christchurch City in the 
2006 Census was approximately 9,500 of unoccupied and 135,000 occupied properties 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2006). Most houses built in Christchurch comprised a timber-framed 
superstructure designed in accordance with the national building code, NZS 3604:2011 
(New Zealand Standards, 2011) or earlier documents, with some examples of steel framing 
and structural masonry. Generally, residential foundations built within the last 30 years 
comprised a concrete slab-on-grade construction, whilst older dwellings were predominantly 
built using a suspended timber floor on a joist and bearer system, supported by timber, 
concrete or aggregate piles and a reinforced or unreinforced perimeter foundation wall 
providing lateral resistance (Buchanan and Newcombe, 2010). 
Outside of residential development, CCC (2010) published a fact pack of Christchurch City 
which listed the following statistics around the city’s-built environment: 
 The Christchurch City Plan listed 582 heritage items, which included buildings, places, 
and objects. 
 There were eight hospitals, 163 schools, three major tertiary institutions, 19 library 
facilities and 12 sports centres and swimming pools. 
 Retail businesses in the central city and the 12 main suburban centres were 
approximately 1,100. 
Whilst not directly relating to number of physical structures, there were an estimated 
38,000 businesses in the city. (“business” for these statistics is defined as an enterprise with 
annual sales/expenses exceeding NZ$30,000). 
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Uma et al. (2013) produced an inventory of Christchurch using the asset model development 
for “Riskscape” (King and Bell, 2009), based on 160,000 buildings. Acknowledging that the 
data are post-CES, it provides an indicative view of construction type across Christchurch. 
Figure A-4 presents the number of buildings that fall into each of the construction material 
categories and whilst the report goes on to discuss sub-categorising this based on 
use/occupancy into residential, commercial, and industrial, the quantities of these 
sub-categories were not reported. 
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B.1. Horizontal Infrastructure 
 Electrical Network 
B.1.1.1. 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
Despite the 4.0 m fault offset which intersected two of the single circuit 220 kV transmission 
lines in Darfield, no power outages occurred across these lines. Similarly, no damage was 
observed to the steel lattice towers that were near the fault rupture. However, the fault offset 
caused high-tension loads to the ground wires, resulting in bending of two tower extensions. 
The Islington to Papanui 66 kV overhead circuit broke at the terminal tower and cracking was 
observed on spill prevention containment walls around transformers at the Papanui 66 kV 
substation. At three of the substations (Addington-Middleton, Islington, and Hororata), 
circuits and transformers were tripped either by: fault protection measures; vibration of the 
mercury switches recording false over-temperature readings; or by sloshing of oil causing high 
oil pressure warnings, tripping the transformer. Transpower estimated repair costs through 
early October 2010 were in the order of NZ$150,000, indicating that only a small number of 
items were damaged at the Transpower substations. 
The reported damage to the Orion network appears to be significantly less than to 
Transpower in its higher voltage assets. Of the 2,200 km buried cable network managed by 
Orion, around 24 cables (Eidinger and Tang, 2012) equivalent to approximately 88 km (4%), 
were damaged with 30 faults occurring along this cable length (Kwasinski et al., 2014). 
There was also minor damage to overhead lines in rural areas due to whipping of poles and 
conductors, and leaning in areas of significant land movement and liquefaction. 
However, there was no disruption to supply in any of these circumstances. The information 
in the literature indicates that only two 33 kV poles were leaning (Eidinger and Tang, 2012) 
and the two oil-filled low pressure 66 kV circuits on the Dallington pedestrian bridge were 
partially crushed where the cables transitioned from a buried condition into the 
pile-supported bridge (Kwasinski et al., 2014) as shown in Figure B-1.  
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Figure B-1: Crushed 66kV cables at Dallington bridge (Eidinger and Tang, 2012) 
 
In the 400 v network, at the junctions between underground cables and the ring main unit 
switchgears, there were several cases where cables had been pulled, some by up to 0.5 m, 
causing some arching damage. The remaining recorded damage to the low voltage network 
comprised two ground mounted transformer pads undergoing significant movement, causing 
excessive stress on low voltage cables, and approximately 100 m of cable being damaged, all 
of which required replacing (Watson, 2010). 
The rural 11 kV network managed by Mainpower sustained damage due to conductor clashes 
and severe leaning of poles. Within the buried network managed by Mainpower, 17 faults 
were identified in the 11 kV cables, caused by sideways forces and stretching, with damage 
observed over several metres around the immediate fault. This recorded damage resulted in 
Mainpower replacing approximately 3 km of cable, in 11 cable sections (Watson, 2010). 
Generally, the majority (approximately 80%) of the issues caused to the network were a result 
of transformers tripping due to the oil surge protection measures (Kwasinski et al., 2014; 
Watson, 2010). Estimates of fault restoration presented in Cubrinovski and Green (2010) 
indicated that 90% of the service was restored by the end of day one, and by day 10, nine of 
the 20 high voltage cable faults had been repaired. The estimated repair cost was in the order 
of NZ$4m (Giovinazzi et al., 2011).  
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B.1.1.2. 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Significantly greater levels of damage were caused to the electrical network because of the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. As a result, there were considerably more 
reports in the literature which document the recorded damage. Of  particular note are the 
observations by Massie (2011), which contain photographs of cable damage (Figure B-2) and 
were subsequently reported further in Massie and Watson (2011). Giovinazzi and 
Wilson (2012), and those who had previously documented damage caused by the 4th 
September 2010 Darfield Earthquake (Eidinger and Tang, 2012; Giovinazzi et al., 2011; 
Kwasinski et al., 2014) also reported damage sustained to the electrical network. These have 
also been summarised by asset type below.  
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A large amount of the damage occurred to PILCA cables with the predominant fault resulting 
from existing joints pulling apart (Kwasinski et al., 2014). Other faults were caused due to 
inflexibility of the cables, leading them to become “kinked” (Figure B-2). 
Massie and Watson (2011) reported that at the time of writing, 600 cables had been repaired 
comprising approximately 1,500 joint repairs with major cable damage shown in the 
schematic in Figure B-3. Generally, when compared to the 4th September 2010 Darfield 
Earthquake, it cost approximately ten times more(NZ$40-50m) and took a total of 10 days to 
restore 90% of the service (Giovinazzi et al., 2011).  
 
Figure B-3: Major cable damage following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Massie 
and Watson, 2011) 
Within the 220 kV network managed by Transpower, the damage sustained to the system was 
modest. The Bromley substation experienced some liquefaction and component damage, and 
one 66 kV tower out in the Port Hills sustained damage from a rock falling through the tower, 
but remained standing. Many of the Transpower high-voltage systems tripped offline without 
sustaining damage (Kwasinski et al., 2014). 
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Upon review of the available literature, there appears to be no damage sustained, or at least 
recorded, to the 33 kV network. However, across the 66kV network, the available literature 
(Eidinger and Tang, 2012; Giovinazzi et al., 2011; Kwasinski et al., 2014; Massie and Watson, 
2011) indicates that approximately 30 out of 60 km sustained damage and occurred to all 
parallel cables over lengths of less than 10cm i.e. damage was concentrated at specific 
locations and not randomly along entire lengths of cable. The observed cable failures 
occurred in areas of readily observed liquefaction indicating that failures were not due to high 
levels of ground shaking alone. In eastern Christchurch, where Permanent Ground 
Deformations (PGDs) were prevalent (5- 50 cm), all four cables suppling the Dallington and 
Brighton zone substations were damaged beyond repair and had to be abandoned 
(including the two cables crossing Dallington pedestrian bridge, damaged from the 
4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake but repaired prior to the 22nd February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake). The remaining known faults manifesting along the pipe-type, 
oil-filled, thermal backfilled cables occurred in areas of Central Christchurch where PGDs were 
of a much smaller magnitude (1- 5 cm). Three of these failures occurred in areas of moderate 
liquefaction between Armagh and Addington substations, likely due to settlements and 
lateral spreading of the nearby Avon River. It is surmised that the observations in 
Kwasinski et al. (2014) relating to six failures occurring along a 3 km length of cable through 
central Christchurch, are these same sets of cables. In these observations, it was noted that 
at five of the six locations (assumed to be the locations highlighted in Figure B-3), all parallel 
phases faulted. Within the XPLE cable network, nine repairs were required to the 1,600 mm2 
XPLE cables, including the cable (installed in 2002) between Armagh and Lancaster 
substations where failures occurred in three locations in areas of moderate liquefaction.  
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Through field inspections and numerical modelling undertaken by Kwasinski et al. (2014), the 
following generalised cable failure methods were identified:  
 In all cases, no large PGDs were evident on the roadway above the cable faults. 
 Cracking in the roadways/adjacent curb sides were commonly less than 1 cm. 
 PGDs manifested by small differential settlements and cracking which crossed the 
street, transverse to cable alignments. However, the damage condition of cables did 
not match PGDs at the ground surface. 
 All cables showed evidence of stretching in tension (generally less than 5 cm), resulting 
in yielding and lengthening of cable. 
 Cracking observed in thermal concrete was transverse to the cables. 
 Cables underwent curvature of 2- 4 cm in the vertical direction with a bend radius of 
less than 1 m. The tight bend radius resulted in insulation layers of XPLE cables being 
squashed, and the pipe-type cables to lose its pressure boundary. 
One of the key observations/conclusions from this work identified that cables that were dug 
up showed evidence of complete insulation failure. Once insulation is damaged, cable failures 
can occur within seconds but may take minutes, days or even months. 
Kwasinski et al. (2014), noted that Orion reported a total of 140 cables in the 11 kV network, 
including all 80 cables in the Brighton-Dallington areas, as being damaged. Table 12 presents 
a percentage breakdown for each of the land damage categories as assessed by 
Cubrinovski and Taylor (2011) of the approximately 1000 faults identified in 330 out of 
2,300 km of cable (roughly 14%) (Giovinazzi et al., 2011).  
Table 12: Percentage of 11 kV cable faults for each land damage category following the 22nd February 
2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). 
Land damage category % 11 KV cable faults 
Moderate to severe 86% 
Minor to moderate 8% 
Minor 6% 
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The rate of 11 kV cable failures was 2-4 times higher than normal, extending for months after 
the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake suggesting that many operable 11 kV cables 
had sustained insulation damage, taking some time to lead to ultimate failure. By 2013, 
433 repairs had been carried out (Eidinger and Tang, 2012). Repairs generally comprised 
replacing a length of old cable with multiple faults, with approximately 20 to 100 m of XLPE 
cable (in most cases). 
Very few of the 400 v distribution cables failed (approximately 0.6% or 15 of the 2,500 km). 
Overall the low voltage cables performed better and suffered fewer faults when compared to 
the 11 kV networks. Of the non-cable electrical network assets damaged as a result of the 
22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, Massie and Watson (2011) reported five of the 
314 substations were severely damaged, identified as the following: 
 New Brighton and Pages Road substations lost to liquefaction. 
 St Andrews Hill substation severely damaged by shaking. 
 Wakefield Avenue North damaged by rock fall. 
 Port Hills Road infill wall failed. 
Kwasinski et al. (2014) inferred a correlation between a higher number of faults occurring in 
higher voltage cables being due to the percentage of cable buried versus overhead. Though, 
based on the information documented above, the inverse is considered true. When 
considered as percentages, the perception is that the higher voltage cables experienced more 
faults (i.e. 50% of 66 kV cables experienced a fault). However, when considered as total cable 
length, because there is a significantly greater quantity of 11 kV cable compared to 66 kV, this 
results in 31 km of 66 kV cable experiencing faulting versus 126.5 km of 11 kV cable. This 
correlation is further questioned with respect to higher voltage cables having a higher ratio 
of buried cables compared to overhead. When assessing the 400 v network, the majority of 
this network is buried when compared to the higher voltages, and yet only 0.6% of cable 
(roughly 16 km) was recorded as having faulted due to the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake. Whilst the exact number of individual repairs to the electricity network is 
unknown, approximately 375 km of cable had been damaged, taking 700 electricity sector 
workers more than 200,000 working hours to repair (Giovinazzi and Wilson, 2012).  
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 Water Network 
B.1.2.1. 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
Both Cubrinovski and Green (2010) and Eidinger and Tang (2012) highlighted damage to two 
residential suburbs that were affected the greatest, that of Brooklands and Spencerville to 
the north of Christchurch CBD. Neither had a functioning wastewater collection system and 
the former was without potable water. Also in this region, significant ground subsidence 
caused 25 manholes to be lifted by approximately 28-46 cm above existing road surface. 
Elsewhere in Christchurch, other damaged water infrastructure included sliding smaller water 
storage tanks (four out of six that were made from steel, three out of four made from wood), 
as well as damage to the concrete roof of a buried concrete tank. Eight wells were also 
reported as damaged, thought to be due to casing pipe failures in liquefaction zones. 
Eidinger and Tang (2012) provided the most comprehensive source of information relating to 
the wastewater network. Two of CCC’s wastewater dry well lift stations had tilted and floated 
due to liquefaction and lateral spreading-based movement. Other typical damage to pipe 
networks included cracking and rupturing of brittle pipes, influx of groundwater laden with 
sand and silt causing blockages, and discharge of untreated sewage into local rivers. 
Initial estimates predicted roughly 70 km of wastewater pipes would have to be replaced, the 
majority of which were in areas of significant settlement and lateral spreading. 
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B.1.2.2. 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
For the wastewater network, between 96 km and 142 km were out of service and 
approximately 474  km- 542 km were at reduced capacity (Cubrinovski et al., 2011; Eidinger 
and Tang, 2012). The wastewater system was heavily damaged to the point of failure in 
April 2011, predominantly caused by the Bromley wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) 
operating at 30% capacity. The reduced capacity was due to damage caused to seven of the 
eight reinforced concrete mains pipes which fed to the treatment plant (with the eighth 
leaking). During this time 25% or 60 million litres of raw sewage leaked out of damaged pipes 
into residences, rivers, and the sea, causing health and environmental issues. There were no 
reported building collapses in the sewer system assets. However, several were damaged due 
to liquefaction and shaking including the Pages Road sewage pumping station where 
differential settlement of the structure occurred and floating of suction wells by 100- 150 mm. 
Liquefaction-induced differential settlement impacted all facilities at the Bromley wastewater 
treatment plant including one of two pumping stations, which had leaked due to damage to 
a mechanical coupling. 
Building damage to the potable water network was reported in Eidinger and Tang (2012) 
where the majority of damage was sustained to water tanks. 12 were reported as damaged 
at the roof or roof-to-wall connections, seven tanks were leaking due to wall damage, and 
five had cracked at the wall-to-foundation connections.  
The key takeaways from the water network performance during the 22nd February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake are the following: 
 Due to the wastewater system being at greater depths than the potable water 
network (3-4 m versus ~0.6 m), it is more vulnerable to liquefaction effects.  
 Overall the most severe damage was inflicted by lateral spreading. 
 As demonstrated by the successful performance of HDPE pipes in Horseshoe Lake, all 
new pressure mains made extensive use of HDPE pipe. 
 Whilst as would be expected, priority was given to repairing the potable water 
network. The extensive damage to the wastewater network and the secondary 
impacts that were caused to health and the environment should be carefully 
considered and reviewed with respect to resilience and future performance.  
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B.2. Vertical Infrastructure 
 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
Kam et al. (2010) presented statistics for the distribution of the 717 CCC/MCDEM Building 
Safety Evaluation (BSE) building safety placards for reinforced concrete buildings in the CBD, 
following the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake. Of those assessed as at 
20th September  2010: 91% were deemed green, meaning that there was no restriction on use 
or occupancy; 8% yellow (restricted use); and 1% Red (unsafe). These statistics demonstrate 
that seismic-resistant designed buildings performed as expected, and generally those that 
didn’t were those built prior to the seismic codes in place at the time of the report. 
Bruneau et al. (2010) provided a preliminary assessment of steel building damage and 
surmises that these structures suffered little damage. The observations made concluded that 
damage manifested as either slight plastic yielding, damage to the concrete components of 
the steel and concrete lateral load resisting frames, isolated instances of connector failure, 
and collapse of steel tanks and storage tanks. Bruneau et al. (2010) also noted that as a whole, 
the general building stock in the Christchurch CBD contained a small proportion of medium 
to high-rise steel buildings, as there had always been a strong tradition of using seismically 
designed reinforced concrete, dating back from the 1970s. 
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 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
Eidinger and Tang (2012) estimated building and infrastructure damage in the range of 
NZ$15bn- NZ$25bn with more than 500 commercial buildings damaged in the CBD. 
That estimation was relatively accurate when reviewing the work by Kam et al. (2011) who 
presented statistics of CBD building damage following the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake, similar to that undertaken for the 4th September 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
described in Section B.2.1. Kam et al. (2011) noted a total number of assessed CBD buildings 
as 2,721, as a split of 58% and 42% for commercial and residential buildings, respectively. 
Whilst the categories of safety placards do not distinguish between residential and 
commercial buildings, it can be reasonably assumed that the 48% of yellow and red placards 
(Section 2.3.3.4.2) weren’t all assigned to just one type. Even if it was an even distribution, 
this would result in somewhere between 420 and 835 commercial buildings with a yellow or 
red placard, which is within the estimation by Eidinger and Tang (2012) above. Whilst the 
percentages reported by Kam et al. (2011) almost match those in Stevenson et al. (2011), the 
number of buildings vastly differs where Stevenson et al. (2011) presented a total of 3,621. 
Contrary to this, Uma et al. (2013) and Cubrinovski et al. (2014) documented that the CBD of 
Christchurch was practically lost with the majority of its buildings significantly damaged. 
There is a discrepancy in number of buildings where the former reports 90% of the 
2,036  buildings as either being categorised as red or yellow, and the latter notes the majority 
of the 3,000 buildings damaged beyond repair.  
This contradiction in views on extent of damage and number of buildings is likely to be due to 
either the following: 
 Between the initial assessment in 2011 and the time of the 2014 article, some initially 
assessed as safe for occupancy as part of a rapid assessment may have later been 
deemed unsafe. 
 Due to the time lapse between the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake and 
the works by Cubrinovski et al. (2014) and Uma et al. (2013), it is possible that 
buildings that were damaged by later events (such as the 13th June 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake and the 23rd December 2011 Christchurch Earthquake) were incorrectly 
identified as being damaged by the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. 
 The definition and assessment area of “Christchurch CBD” may differ between the 
articles.  
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When the residential building stock was assessed, generally lightweight timber framed 
structures performed very well and whilst there was evidence of soft-storey failure 
(Figure B-4) and superstructure damage caused by slab rupture or different foundation 
systems, overall, most of these buildings maintained their structural integrity. 
Two key points that Buchanan et al. (2011) made with respect to residential design is the 
importance of wall bracing stiffness and arrangement. The extensive assessments undertaken 
highlighted where newer architecturally designed houses had chosen to favour available 
views over symmetrical bracing wall configurations; the resulting damage was excessive. 
The second point related to foundation-superstructure connections where there were several 
examples of houses that appeared to have no obvious connection between the timber 
bottom plate and the foundations. In these cases, superstructures were observed to have slid 
by up to 300 mm over the foundations (Figure B-5). 
 
Figure B-4: Examples of soft-storey failure of timber framed houses (Buchanan et al., 2011) 
 
Figure B-5: (left) reinforced slab damage; (right) house sliding on foundations (Buchanan et al., 2011) 
 
 
